This article was displayed on the ChosunBiz RM Report site at 5:02 p.m. on Jan. 26, 2026.
Recently, prosecutors have increasingly launched their own compulsory investigations into price-fixing cases directly tied to consumer prices, without waiting for the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate. They move first to secure evidence through searches and seizures, identify the substance of the case, and then ask the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) in reverse to file a complaint.
With the government defining price-fixing as a "crime that harms people's livelihoods," prosecutors have effectively taken the lead in cartel investigations while keeping the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) in check.
According to legal sources on the 26th, the Fair Trade Investigation Department of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office (headed by Director General Na Hee-seok) recently estimated the scale of price-fixing by flour-milling corporations such as Daehan Flour Mills, Sajo Dongaone, and CJ CheilJedang at more than 4 trillion won and expanded the probe to all seven member companies of the Korea Flour Mills Industrial Association. The scope was widened with the possibility of structural price-fixing across the milling industry, rather than focusing on individual corporations.
The current flour price-fixing investigation is being carried out by prosecutors on their own without a Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) complaint.
Typically, in cases of violations of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act such as price-fixing, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC), which holds the exclusive right to file complaints, begins the probe first. After the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) decides through a full commission meeting whether to issue corrective orders and impose a penalty surcharge, it files a complaint with prosecutors depending on the matter, which then generally leads to a prosecutorial investigation and trial.
Lately, however, prosecutors have moved to strengthen direct investigations even in fair trade cases, seeking to secure the initiative. They have been invoking the "right to request a complaint" as a tool to check the exclusive complaint authority.
If the prosecutor general, the Minister of SMEs and Startups, the head of the Public Procurement Service, and others request a complaint, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) must file one. Prosecutors first begin the investigation and then, in the name of the prosecutor general, exercise the right to request a complaint to obtain the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC)'s filing afterward.
In September last year, prosecutors also opened an investigation into alleged sugar price-fixing without a Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) complaint. They then asked the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) three times to file a complaint and sent 11 executives and employees of CJ CheilJedang and Samyang Corporation to trial. Two executive-level officials from the two companies were indicted and detained.
At the time, prosecutors said in a press release that "the corporations in question had been caught multiple times for past price-fixing, but the response was limited to measures such as a penalty surcharge, allowing price-fixing to become an entrenched chronic ill of the industry," and "by launching a compulsory investigation, we uncovered the full picture of the price-fixing crimes." It was interpreted as reflecting the view that administrative sanctions alone are insufficient to break cartels.
Legal circles say prosecutors' proactive investigations into price-fixing cases align with the government's stance of strictly cracking down on "crimes that disrupt the people's economy."
President Lee Jae-myung said at a Cabinet meeting in September last year that "we cannot rule out the possibility of price-fixing among companies in connection with the surge in prices of daily necessities," and ordered relevant ministries to respond actively.
Another factor cited for prosecutors stepping in directly is that the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC)'s case-handling periods are too long.
According to the British policy journal Global Competition Review (GCR) at the end of 2024, the average investigation period for cartel cases at Korea's Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) was reported to reach 670 days. For market monopoly and dominance cases, the investigation period was 56 months. Among 17 countries surveyed, it ranked 15th. That is six times longer than New Zealand (8.7 months) or Taiwan (9 months), and about three times that of Peru (16 months).
In fact, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) investigated price-fixing on Korea–Southeast Asia sea routes by 23 shipping companies, including Korea Marine Transport Co. (KMTC), and imposed a penalty surcharge of 96.2 billion won in January 2022, but it took more than three years from the filing in August 2018 to the conclusion.
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) also has its constraints. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) does not have compulsory investigative powers such as search and seizure. While it can open ex officio investigations into violations of the fair trade law, it is limited to relying on voluntary submissions to secure materials.
An attorney at a large law firm said, "The tug-of-war between prosecutors and the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) is nothing new. There have been cases in the past where prosecutors dismissed charges in cases first referred by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC)," adding, "prosecutors are seeking to assert their presence in line with the government's policy of stabilizing prices."