Former President Yoon Suk-yeol argued at the closing hearing in the case charging him as the ringleader of an insurrection that the Dec. 3 martial law "can never be a disruption of the constitutional order. It cannot be a riot," adding, "The president's exercise of emergency powers cannot be an insurrection."
The Seoul Central District Court Criminal Division 25 (Presiding Judge Jee Kui-youn, Director General) opened the closing hearing at 9:30 a.m. on the 13th in the case charging the former president as the ringleader of an insurrection. After a lengthy review of documentary evidence submitted by the former president's side, the special counsel investigating the insurrection case sought the death penalty for the former president.
The former president's final statement began at about 12:11 a.m. on the 14th. The former president started reading his prepared final statement and skipped portions. The statement ended at about 1:41 a.m., one hour and 30 minutes later.
Denying the charge of being the ringleader of an insurrection, the former president said, "Please examine the constitutional implications of this case and the grave sense of responsibility with which, as president, I tried to prevent a collapse of constitutional governance and a paralysis of state affairs in a national crisis."
Regarding the indictment by the special counsel investigating the insurrection case, the former president said it was "nothing but delusion and fiction that do not match objective facts." On the martial law, he argued it was "to inform the sovereign people of a national emergency and to appeal for them to join in overcoming it."
As a reason for declaring martial law, he cited the Democratic Party of Korea's impeachment of Choi Jae-hae, then head of the Board of Audit and Inspection, and Lee Chang-su, then head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office. The former president said, "Impeaching the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection, a constitutional officeholder, is, in short, a statement of intent to overturn the constitutional system," adding, "I thought I had no choice but to sound the alarm to the sovereign people against the dictatorship of the National Assembly."
The following is the full text of the former president's final statement.
Yoon Suk-yeol, former president, final statement
Honorable presiding judge, honorable members of the bench
I am deeply grateful for your thorough and fair proceedings over nearly a year under wise case management.
They branded a mere few hours of martial law as an insurrection, prompting every investigative body in the country to rush in, and then even set up an extra-large special counsel to investigate. They indiscriminately booked and detained numerous public officials who had faithfully performed their duties if they did not give the testimony sought, and they repeatedly brought unreasonable indictments. I wonder if such a thing has ever happened in the history of modern civilized nations. Yet even amid the frenzy of "purge and repression," I pay respect to the court for keeping its balance and leading the trial according to law and principle.
A broadcaster said, "Have you ever seen an insurrection that is announced nationwide and worldwide on air and then stops a couple of hours later because the National Assembly says to stop?" and "Have you ever seen an insurrection with empty guns without bullets?" I believe these words symbolically show the illusion of the gale that swept this country over the past year.
The indictment in this case is nothing but delusion and fiction that do not match objective facts. I myself handled investigations and trials for 26 years, but I have never seen multiple agencies rush in madly to investigate without any command structure. Without a proper command structure, they engage not in investigation but in fabrication and distortion toward the unthinking goal of branding it an insurrection. I feel they look like a pack of wolves that, at the whistle of the Democratic Party of Korea, which holds an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly, and of the dark forces that have long ruled Korea, blindly rush in and tear apart.
It was precisely that martial law, made the prey of the wolf pack's insurrection branding, that I declared at about 10:30 p.m. on Dec. 3, 2024.
In concert with anti-state forces, forces seeking to overthrow the system, and forces of external encroachment on sovereignty, the major opposition Democratic Party of Korea manipulated public opinion with false agitation and drove a wedge between the government and the people. With unconstitutional legislative dictatorship, they collapsed constitutional governance, paralyzed state affairs, and drove the nation into a crisis of national ruin.
As president charged with the grave duty to ensure the independence of the Republic of Korea, the continuity of the state, and the defense of the Constitution, I declared martial law to inform the sovereign people of this national emergency and to appeal for them to join in overcoming it. With the nation in crisis due to the National Assembly's unconstitutional dictatorship, there was no other way than to awaken the sovereign people. It was an appeal for the sovereign to step forward and, with sharp criticism, monitor and check the ruinous abuses of representative power by taking interest in politics and state affairs.
Among the small number of troops deployed to secure security and order at the National Assembly, some sat unarmed under the Assembly's outer wall, and others, carrying only empty guns, were surrounded and assaulted by thousands in the Assembly courtyard. No one oppressed the people or interfered with lawmakers' scheduling to vote on the demand to lift martial law.
Ninety-two members of the Special Warfare Command and 15 from the Capital Defense Command entered the Assembly compound around midnight, but an enormous crowd had already poured in and the troops were too few even to perform order-keeping duties properly. Although additional troops arrived near the Assembly belatedly, as soon as the resolution demanding the lifting of martial law passed, all forces immediately withdrew.
At the National Election Commission, under the authority to oversee administrative and judicial affairs pursuant to Article 7 of the Martial Law Act, they entered to conduct a security check of the election management system, but due to lack of time and preparation, they did nothing and left after only taking photos of the server equipment. This was because, in election lawsuits, large quantities of fake ballots had been found, and just a year earlier, a National Intelligence Service (NIS) security inspection of the commission's IT system revealed a grave situation in which it fell far short of standards required of a national agency and was defenseless against external hacking.
The election system is a core system that forms the governing order of modern representative democracies. In a liberal democracy, election management must be firmly guaranteed for transparency and fairness. Nevertheless, because the National Election Commission refused transparent and fair verification, we ordered a check in light of the importance of election management and public interest.
Did they disrupt the constitutional order?
Did they start a riot?
It took six hours from the declaration to the lifting of martial law, but the delay was only in convening a Cabinet meeting at dawn to lift it; in fact, two hours after the declaration, once the National Assembly passed the resolution demanding the lifting of martial law, troops were immediately withdrawn and the martial-law situation ended. I also issued an address to the nation announcing the lifting of martial law while the Cabinet meeting was being convened.
At first, the public was bewildered as to why the president declared martial law. But before long, many people came to understand the urgent situation that led to the declaration, and when I was impeached and faced impeachment proceedings, a majority of the public opposed my impeachment. They understood the reasons for the declaration and its inevitability. I believe that even now many people understand why I sounded the alarm by declaring martial law.
Many still believe that the Dec. 3 martial law was not a militarized administrative dictatorship to oppress the people, as in the authoritarian past, but a measure to protect the people's freedom and sovereignty and to save the nation and constitutional governance. In particular, the younger generation—youth and students—understand the reasons for martial law and the perilous state of the nation and are seriously considering their roles and actions.
Even the Constitutional Court, which decided to impeach me, ruled that "as head of the executive branch and head of state, the president, the respondent, appears to have recognized that state affairs were being paralyzed and the national interest significantly harmed by the opposition party's arbitrariness, and to have felt a heavy sense of responsibility that this had to be overcome somehow. The declaration of martial law in this case and the accompanying measures can be understood as based on such recognition and sense of responsibility held by the respondent as the highest official in charge of state affairs."
Everyone, regardless of their position for or against martial law, knows precisely the purpose and necessity for which I declared it. It had nothing whatsoever to do with the purposes of riot or disruption of the constitutional order.
Forces seeking to overturn the system and anti-state forces began holding preemptive impeachment rallies against the president-elect, who had not even taken office, right after the Mar. 2022 presidential election. It was a refusal to accept the election result. Until the Dec. 3 declaration of martial law, a total of 178 rallies calling for my resignation or impeachment were held continuously. Figures from the major opposition Democratic Party of Korea also stood on stage at these rallies. This was not merely some anti-government protests but organized resignation and impeachment rallies linked to the institutional sphere.
In several spy-ring cases investigated by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), it has been confirmed that the spies received orders to shake and paralyze the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which was faithful to liberal democracy and the South Korea-U.S. alliance, by any means necessary. They have relentlessly sowed division in national opinion by spreading and sharing orders from North Korea. The Democratic Party of Korea also worked with them, abusing the legislature's constitutional authority to impeach public officials en masse and to ram through legislation and budgets, attempting to paralyze state affairs.
You all know how they shackled the legislation needed to implement the elected government's policy agenda, making it impossible to work. Unprecedented acts took place repeatedly in our constitutional and parliamentary history. The major opposition party, in concert with forces seeking to overturn the system and anti-state forces, abused the National Assembly's constitutional powers to turn the government—devoted to the constitutional order of liberal democracy and a market economy, to the South Korea-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of our security and economy, and to South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation against the North's nuclear threat—into a lame-duck administration. They sought to overturn our constitutional order and break our solidarity with the free world.
In particular, they persistently obstructed strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance on a nuclear basis and conducting joint missile defense responses through South Korea-U.S.-Japan naval and air cooperation to counter the North's nuclear threat. If this persistent subversion of core national interests is not the work of anti-state forces, then what is it? Is it patriotic?
They refused legislation on the economy and livelihoods to keep a government faithful to liberal democracy from doing anything, mass-produced unconstitutional laws, and trampled on security and the economy. By repeatedly submitting bills that undermine core national interests, they sought to induce presidential vetoes and stoke national division.
Following the abolition of the NIS's counterespionage investigative authority, they pushed to scrap the National Security Act, building up to system overthrow, and opposed revisions to the espionage statute even as state secrets and advanced industrial technologies were being leaked one after another to China. They even prevented a minimal reciprocal response to China's anti-espionage law.
For national security, it is crucial to expand defense industry technology and industrial infrastructure, to grow the defense market, and to build solidarity among partner countries in defense cooperation. The National Assembly, controlled by the major opposition party, pushed a bill requiring Assembly approval for defense exports, wielding a knife against security cooperation with the free world, putting brakes on defense exports opposed by North Korea, China, and Russia, and endangering defense technology security.
Their rampage against core security budgets is even more outrageous. They slashed the project budgets for surveillance and reconnaissance assets and missile defense interception systems needed for rapid response to North Korea's nuclear and missile attacks, making project implementation impossible. A firm response to the North's nuclear and missile threats is critical not only for security but also for attracting investment and revitalizing the economy by reducing national risk.
There was severe attrition among noncommissioned officers and junior officers—the backbone of our forces—due to poor conditions. They also blocked budget measures to improve conditions to encourage these skilled personnel to serve long-term. The allocated funds would not have placed a large tax burden on the people. It was exasperating to see them pick out and cut only such core budgets—one wonders whose directions they were following.
A prime example regarding public safety budgets is cutting personnel costs to block narcotics investigations and abolishing special activity funds. Even under the Democratic Party government, they consolidated narcotics investigations under the police and dismantled the prosecution's seasoned and capable narcotics units; now they have cut even the police investigation budget. Narcotics not only sicken future generations; those who control the drug market dominate all criminal organizations and eventually wield enormous influence over a country's politics and society. In today's immoral hybrid, non-kinetic strategies and tactics that use any means necessary, a national response to the war on drugs is vital, yet they are deliberately ignoring this. It is hard to understand why the Democratic Party is so passive and shrinking from narcotics response. Which country's party and which country's National Assembly is this?
Along with abolishing prosecutorial investigative authority and investigation activity funds, they handed over corruption and major financial fraud cases wholesale to less specialized agencies. But to suppress political opponents and dissenters, they created extra-large special counsels that both investigate and prosecute, poured hundreds of billions of won in taxpayers' money into them, pursued rabbit-drive investigations, indicted on fiction, and devoted themselves to stoking public opinion.
Under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, 22 impeachment motions against public officials were introduced; some resigned and some were impeached and suspended from duty. Impeachment trials usually take six to nine months, and sometimes more than a year. Even when one resigns to prevent prolonged suspension and paralysis of state affairs, selecting a successor, vetting, and confirmation take many procedures and much time. After taking office, it also takes time to get up to speed and take control of the organization. Staff at the relevant agencies also need time to adapt to the new chief's policy direction and go through difficulties doing so.
Over some 70 years of our constitutional history, there were hardly any impeachment motions and impeachments of public officials. Only under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration did the number reach 22 before martial law and 30 before the decision to impeach me. They even impeached the prime minister after impeaching the president, and tried to impeach the deputy prime minister. Is this a normal exercise of the impeachment power? Does the Constitution allow such legislative and budgetary rampages and mass impeachments of innocent public officials just because one holds a majority of seats in the National Assembly?
This is a clear abuse of constitutional authority and plainly violates the spirit and purpose of the Constitution.
Why do you think they are so persistently waging this unconstitutional legislative dictatorship? Isn't it to overturn the national course that the Constitution directs us to pursue—liberal democracy, a free market economy, and solidarity with the free world? Isn't it to overthrow the system?
I was appalled to see the push to impeach the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection and the head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office.
The head of the Board of Audit and Inspection was an audit expert appointed under a Democratic Party government and not a political figure. At the time, an unprecedented hiring corruption scandal erupted at the National Election Commission. About 1,000 people were allegedly hired illegally as if it were a family-run firm, and after a preliminary inquiry by the Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission, the Board conducted an audit. It also audited security officials who leaked state secrets related to the THAAD deployment to China under the Democratic Party government and referred the matter to prosecutors. Yet the Democratic Party obstructed the Board's necessary and lawful audits by impeaching its head.
Given these circumstances, one could not help but see it as blatant exposure of collusion between the election commission and the Democratic Party, and organized protection of espionage-abetting acts involving the leak of state secrets.
Impeaching the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection, a constitutional officeholder, is tantamount to saying you will overturn the constitutional system. If the head of the Board, who audits all public officials and affiliated agencies nationwide, state-run companies, the Financial Services Commission (FSC), the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC), and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), is impeached and suspended from duty without any misconduct warranting dismissal, what will happen to state administration and public discipline? This is unprecedented not only in our constitutional history but also in the world's constitutional history.
The Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office is a key investigative and judicial body that handles more than 50% of major cases such as corruption and economic crimes. Seeing them push to impeach prosecutors investigating their own corruption to pressure and line them up, I thought, 'If they don't like a verdict, they will impeach the judge next.' Wielding the impeachment power in a frenzy, they would ultimately destroy constitutional governance. Our Constitution does not allow this kind of National Assembly or this kind of parliamentarism.
Watching the Democratic Party push to impeach the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection and the head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office, I had endured until then but concluded that I had no choice but to sound the alarm to the sovereign people against the ruinous dictatorship of the National Assembly.
I judged that the collapse of constitutional order based on liberal democracy and republicanism, and the grave destabilization of normal performance of state functions—diplomacy, security, economy, future investment, public discipline, law enforcement, and investigative justice—was the most severe national emergency among non-wartime martial law declarations in Korea's past.
However, because the cause of the national emergency was the National Assembly dominated by the major opposition party, I believed there was no other way than to inform, appeal to, and awaken the sovereign people to the abuses and dictatorship of representative power.
Around late Nov. 2024, I had Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun come to the presidential residence in Hannam-dong. Discussing the impeachment of the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection, I explained that the major opposition party was abusing constitutional authority to destroy constitutional governance, paralyze state affairs, and drive the nation into a crisis of ruin. I said the crisis was more serious than in ① the June 3 events opposing the 1964 Korea-Japan talks, ② the Oct. 17, 1972 special declaration following U.S.-China détente and U.S. troop withdrawals, and ③ the Oct. 26, 1979 presidential assassination—times when non-wartime martial law had been declared.
I added that although the major opposition party was abusing constitutional authority to destroy constitutional governance, I intended to exercise the president's constitutional emergency powers within the framework of the Constitution and to appeal to the sovereign people to awaken and alert them, thereby restoring a constitutional order and state affairs paralyzed by collapse. I instructed Minister Kim Yong-hyun that a constitutional declaration of a national emergency effectively meant declaring martial law and ordered him to review and report back.
At the same time, I made several points clear. First, this martial law would be different from past ones, and because the opposition held a majority, the National Assembly would vote to demand lifting martial law quickly—within half a day at the earliest, a day at most. I also emphasized that I would deliver a national address on the declaration in real time, and that a total of 250–280 troops, equivalent to two companies, would be split into two teams—one to maintain order amid crowds expected to gather at the National Assembly, and another to send a few dozen personnel to each of several National Election Commission server sites to check security systems and confirm whether network separation, firewalls, and password issues flagged by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) a year earlier had been fixed.
For the deployed troops, I prohibited live ammunition and ordered that, to ensure maximum safety, the force be composed of experienced noncommissioned officers or higher, and that they depart their bases only after the president's national address on the declaration. Because their role at the Assembly would be security and order, I instructed that lawmakers and Assembly staff be allowed to enter and work without impediment. The Assembly was in session, so with thousands present, I doubted whether 250–280 troops could maintain order, but I kept the deployment small because a larger force might stoke anxiety and increase the risk of accidents.
Because security was paramount for the declaration, I asked Minister Kim Yong-hyun to review and prepare it alone. Since he had previously served as Director General and Deputy Minister at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), I judged he would be familiar with JCS martial law protocols and manuals.
The actual national address on the declaration was from 10:23–30 p.m. on Dec. 3, the reference time for the declaration was 11 p.m., the military arrived at the Assembly around midnight, and the deployed troops were 92 from the Special Warfare Command and 40 from the Capital Defense Command. Seventy-seven Special Warfare members were in the Assembly courtyard and 15 in the main building, while 15 Capital Defense Command members entered the compound completely unarmed, having even put down their guns, and sat waiting in front of Gate 7.
Additional troops that arrived later reached the rear of the Assembly's main building around 1:03 a.m. on Dec. 4, when the resolution demanding the lifting of martial law passed, but they withdrew immediately afterward.
The 77 Special Warfare members in the Assembly courtyard, under instructions to avoid clashes with civilians, struggled even to hold their positions as they were assaulted by citizens, and after the vote demanding the lifting of martial law, they politely bowed to the citizens and withdrew. The 15 in the main building scurried to avoid fire extinguishers sprayed by Assembly staff, and the Capital Defense Command troops had no contact with civilians at all.
Shortly after midnight following the declaration, Minister Kim Yong-hyun suggested there were things to verify in connection with the National Election Commission and that it would be good to go to the polling firm Kkot and the Democratic Party headquarters, but I ordered that civilian institutions were absolutely off-limits and that no additional troops be deployed. Minister Kim implemented my order immediately.
From late Nov. to Dec. 2, Minister Kim Yong-hyun came to the presidential residence at night to report on preparations. The draft national address he brought needed almost no changes, and I thought the proclamations would not be enforced because martial law would be lifted quickly; besides, if they conflicted with higher law, they would be void, so there was no need to tinker with them.
If the Cabinet meeting required before the declaration were held as a regular session, news of the declaration would leak during the process and cause unnecessary confusion. In that case, we might need to deploy more troops, so to keep the deployment minimal, we decided to maintain maximum secrecy and, before the declaration, to bring to the presidential office the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, unification, interior and safety, and justice—those essential to martial law—along with a few additional ministers as "secure guests" to meet the quorum.
The presidential emergency power to declare martial law is an exclusive constitutional authority exercised solely by the president, and the determination of whether the substantive and procedural requirements are met also belongs to the president. It is subject only to political, ex post control in the form of the National Assembly's demand to lift martial law. There is no precedent in world constitutional history for a president standing in a criminal court over the exercise of emergency powers. Of course, if bloodshed occurs after a declaration, whether individual acts were reasonable and who is responsible is another matter.
The forces branding this an insurrection agitated that I ordered lawmakers dragged out of the Assembly chamber or politicians arrested, but once the secure-phone call logs were revealed, this court found all of it to be fabricated falsehoods.
If we had mobilized tens of thousands of troops and conducted martial law like in the past, it might be another matter, but what do they claim could have been done with a minimal order-keeping force? It is utterly impossible as a matter of common sense.
I made it clear to Minister Kim Yong-hyun that if the motion to impeach the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection, scheduled for Monday, Dec. 2, failed, there would be no declaration. And I said that if the impeachment motion passed on Dec. 2, I would declare martial law the next day, Tuesday, Dec. 3. By declaring during a weekday while the Assembly was in session, my aim was for the president and the Assembly to exercise their respective constitutional powers forthrightly, so the Assembly could vote immediately to demand the lifting of martial law if it so chose.
I believe Minister Kim Yong-hyun spoke about the martial law to the Special Warfare commander and the Capital Defense Command commander, who were to deploy to the Assembly, and to the Defense Counterintelligence Command commander, who was to deploy to the election commission, either just before or just after my national address. As a result, the commanders likely could not prepare or issue orders to their subordinates beforehand.
At the Defense Counterintelligence Command, personnel were on leave or had gone home and, after watching the address on the declaration in the news, returned to base; even after midnight, officers had not fully returned. The Capital Defense Command assembled only a small number centered on night duty officers, deployed to the Assembly with no special orders and only their usual mission of guarding key public facilities. The Special Warfare Command's helicopter flight approval to transport the 707th unit was delayed by the Capital Defense Command, causing a long delay. There had been no communication between agencies in advance.
The forces branding this an insurrection call a martial law lasting a few hours and accompanied by a message to the nation a palace coup. Have you ever seen a palace coup carried out like this? I don't even know how one would do a palace coup, nor have I ever thought about it, but would you announce it on live TV, go in with only a handful of night duty personnel, and make no preparations? If it were a palace coup, why go to the election commission? You could seize the situation and go later—and if it's a palace coup, there wouldn't be any elections for a while, would there?
People may be too busy with their livelihoods to say it openly, but they can judge with common sense. The people are by no means fools.
There was never any plan to deploy the police for the Dec. 3 martial law. Since martial law was declared, I naturally thought only a minimal number of troops would be deployed. At the time, I did not at all consider the 10 or so entrances to the Assembly. Both Minister Kim Yong-hyun and I had visited the Assembly as public servants, so we assumed that at night only the entrance near the members' office building and the main gate would be open.
On the evening of the declaration, Minister Kim Yong-hyun came to my office and said, "Because the number of troops to be deployed is so small, maintaining order will be difficult. It would be good to get police support for the outer perimeter of the Assembly." I tried to connect Minister Kim and National Police Agency Commissioner Cho Ji-ho by phone, then had them meet for about 10–15 minutes at the Samcheong-dong secure facility. The sequence of actions—closing Assembly gates after the declaration, then opening them, then closing again—was solely the police's judgment; there were no instructions from the president, the defense minister, or the martial law commander. The Assembly's gates and wall are so low that people could easily climb over, and in fact thousands entered the courtyard with little restraint.
After the declaration, I spoke with Commissioner Cho Ji-ho five times, starting with the first call of about 55 seconds at 11:15 p.m., then at 11:20 for 36 seconds, 11:28 for 39 seconds, 11:30 for 17 seconds, and 11:34 for 41 seconds. Then, about an hour and 10 minutes later, I spoke at 12:48 a.m. for 32 seconds, 1:08 a.m. for 58 seconds, and 1:10 a.m. for 58 seconds.
The 11:15 p.m. call was to ask about the situation around the Assembly. Commissioner Cho said, "The military hasn't arrived yet and people are surging, so we closed the Assembly gates for now, but Seoul Metropolitan Police Commissioner Kim Bong-sik said that by law lawmakers and Assembly officials must be allowed in, so we are checking IDs and allowing them in." I said, "Commissioner Kim is a career investigator and knows the law—of course, that's the way, good job." In fact, the police began opening the gates and letting in Assembly personnel starting at 11:07 p.m. The four short, successive calls I made to Commissioner Cho between then and 11:34 p.m. were to grasp the situation around the Assembly and out of concern about safety accidents.
As a chief prosecutor and prosecutor general, I always personally monitored field situations like searches and seizures in major cases, so I called the police chief and commanders to understand the scene and prevent safety accidents.
Commissioner Cho testified that at 11:15 p.m. I told him to control the Assembly, and that in the 11:34 p.m. and earlier calls I ordered the arrest of lawmakers who climbed over the wall, but this is entirely untrue and false. In the early phase of the insurrection-branding investigation around Dec. 2024, Commissioner Cho stated that I spoke with him six times and, in all six, told him "Arrest all lawmakers trying to enter the Assembly." But after the secure-phone logs came out, he recently offered new testimony that, among the five calls between 11:15 and 11:34 p.m., in the latter ones I ordered the arrest of "wall-climbing lawmakers." Investigators who heard Commissioner Cho's initial claim in Dec. 2024 that I had ordered the arrest of lawmakers trying to enter the Assembly appear to have found it implausible given the police deployment at the time; even the records show no sign of further questioning or probing.
In Dec. 2025 in this court, even the prosecutor conducting direct examination of Commissioner Cho questioned whether it made sense that the defendant would have given such an order at a time when lawmakers and Assembly officials were free to enter, with no need to climb over the wall.
After the vote to lift martial law and after the lifting itself, I called Commissioner Cho and said, 'Thank you for your hard work, well done. Because the police responded promptly and allowed lawmakers to enter, martial law was lifted quickly,' and added, 'Tell Commissioner Kim Bong-sik to get some rest; I'll call him myself.' According to testimony by Cho and Kim in the Constitutional Court's chamber and in this court, both received such encouraging calls from me, and while the police decided at 11:37 p.m., on their own, to close the Assembly gates, they in fact allowed lawmakers and Assembly officials to enter until midnight. I had no idea the gates were closed again at midnight. That is why, when I called Capital Defense Command Commander Lee Jin-woo at 12:32 a.m. (29 seconds), 12:34 a.m. (16 seconds), and 12:36 a.m. (25 seconds), in the second and third calls I said, 'Find the gate under police control,' and 'Try the gate by the members' office building.' Commander Lee testified in this court in line with that. He also testified that when he arrived after midnight, a huge number of people had entered the compound and the police were even helping people climb the wall by supporting them from behind.
From the early phase of the insurrection-branding investigation in Dec. 2024, investigative bodies elicited massive false testimony from numerous public officials by threatening them with booking, indictment, and detention. For them, the matter of custody, as well as pensions and other livelihood issues, is extremely pressing. As Commander Lee of the Capital Defense Command testified, the media flooded the airwaves with fake news, and investigators pushed witnesses to give the testimony they wanted by saying others had testified that way.
As decisive evidence for the Constitutional Court's impeachment ruling, they cite the testimony of Kwak Jong-geun and Hong Jang-won and the testimony of Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. Had the secure-phone logs and CCTV footage been presented at the impeachment trial, as in this court, the false testimony would have been easily discerned.
At the Constitutional Court, investigative records inadmissible under impeachment procedure law were submitted without limit and used as evidence for fact-finding, on the logic that impeachment is a kind of administrative disciplinary process. But in this court, it has emerged that most of the key evidence was fabricated or false. It is quite regrettable that a president, directly elected by the entire people and possessing the highest democratic legitimacy, was tried and impeached in that way. I suspect the insurrection-branding investigation that raged from immediately after the lifting of martial law was a means to bring down the president in the impeachment trial.
When the National Assembly voted to demand the lifting of martial law, I immediately accepted it, withdrew the troops, and, while waiting for ministers to convene, summoned Minister Kim Yong-hyun and the martial law commander to my office and ordered them to end the military's martial-law posture immediately. Minister Kim promptly convened a video conference of key commanders nationwide and ended the military's martial-law posture, and before the ministers arrived I delivered a national address lifting martial law. Nonetheless, the forces branding this an insurrection would not stop their preposterous agitation that I would declare martial law a second and third time.
After the declaration, I also called Choo Kyung-ho, the People Power Party's floor leader, and said, 'You've had such a hard time dealing with the opposition. I'm sorry I couldn't let you know in advance about the declaration. Lawmakers need not worry. It will end soon.' Representative Choo testified that the president told him, 'If the National Assembly follows procedure and passes a resolution demanding the lifting of martial law, I will accept it immediately and lift it.' The indictment against Representative Choo records this the same way.
Before the declaration, on Dec. 2, I attended a public livelihood forum in Gongju and visited Sanseong Market; on Dec. 3, I completed all events for the Kyrgyz president's official visit to Korea. Over the weekend of Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, I spent almost the entire days reading materials and preparing. My demeanor at official events right before the declaration was no different than usual, with no signs of anxiety or tension, as everyone saw. Had I been plotting a palace coup, I would have postponed such events or chosen a different day for the declaration. Moreover, given that the Assembly was in session on a weekday and could convene a plenary immediately, it is easy to see I had no intention to neutralize or obstruct the plenary.
The Defense Counterintelligence Command commander was on leave for two days from Dec. 1 to Dec. 2, and personnel had gone home; after seeing news of the address, they returned to base after midnight. The Capital Defense Command had a dinner that evening with key officers and spouses, and most had gone home, so recalling them took time; personnel were assembled mainly from night duty officers on the spot. There had been no prior preparation at all.
Because this was a national appeal—a message-to-the-people martial law—I prepared without tension, as usual. It was not an extralegal measure to upend the political landscape but a measure to inform the people of a national crisis of constitutional collapse and paralysis of state affairs and to awaken the sovereign. After lifting martial law at dawn on Dec. 4 and returning to the residence, I was relieved and thankful it ended without safety accidents.
At first, seeing the start of the insurrection-branding, I thought, 'That is what they always do,' and believed that, now that the people recognized the national crisis, things would change. As a legal expert, I found the agitation about insurrection absurd and outrageous.
When I heard that the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) had sought an arrest warrant from the Seoul Western District Court, I thought they lacked jurisdiction over insurrection and, once the warrant was denied, would hand it to the police or prosecution as an exit strategy. Since insurrection was among the articles of impeachment, I believed that if we explained this well during the impeachment proceedings and showed there was no intent to disrupt the constitutional order or start a riot, the investigation would naturally wrap up.
There were political risks, but as public opposition to impeachment grew and people cheered that they had been enlightened, I thought the alarm I sounded had some effect. I conducted major investigations for 26 years as a prosecutor, but because I worked by law and principle, I never imagined that, under the name of investigation, a politically motivated and meticulously planned insurrection-branding would be carried out.
On Jan. 3, 2025, when the CIO came to arrest me at the residence, I thought they would give up because the presidential residence is a protected military facility where entry and searches are prohibited. But on Jan. 15, when thousands of police stormed in, I realized the national crisis I saw was actually far worse. Those who, in the name of an absurd investigation and in violation of law and principle, mobilize thousands of police to arrest a president are the insurrection-branding forces who do not care about constitutional collapse or paralysis of state affairs so long as they seize power.
The Dec. 3 martial law was lifted within hours, and more than a year has passed. Yet the insurrection-branding to purge and repress political opponents and dissenters continues. They pay no heed to Korea's dire alerts over the livelihood and economic crisis, nor to the national crisis of fractures in solidarity with the free world.
But the public and young people know that the martial law became an enlightening decree, and they are saying it was an unavoidable decision in a national crisis.
I have consistently presented my position on the Dec. 3 martial law three times: in my address on Dec. 12, 2024, just before the impeachment motion; in my address on Jan. 15, 2025, just before the CIO arrest; and in my final opinion at the Constitutional Court impeachment trial on Feb. 25, 2025. Today's statement adds the realities confirmed since then through secure-phone call logs and courtroom testimony. Please carefully consider my Dec. 12, 2024 address, my Jan. 15, 2025 address, and my Feb. 25, 2025 final statement at the Constitutional Court, which have been entered into evidence, regarding why I diagnosed a national crisis and declared martial law.
Because of the declaration of martial law to awaken the sovereign in a national crisis, military personnel and public officials who carried out their duties are suffering through hardship as victims of the insurrection-branding. Many people and young people who truly love the country and seek to defend freedom and justice are also going through pain and frustration. I cannot contain my sorrow. It is all due to my shortcomings.
What I can do now is pray. I pray several times a day for the military officers and public officials who are suffering, and for our honest and good people and young people. God's grace and blessings will be abundant with you. And I believe He will keep this nation firm.
I ask you to consider the constitutional implications of this case and the grave sense of responsibility with which, as president, I tried to prevent a collapse of constitutional governance and a paralysis of state affairs in a national crisis. That can never be a disruption of the constitutional order. It cannot be a riot.
I thank the court for its diligent proceedings amid a grueling schedule. I also thank the public who, through attendance and broadcasts, confirmed the facts of this case and offered support.
The president's exercise of emergency powers cannot be an insurrection.
I ask for your wise judgment.
Thank you.