On the 13th, the special counsel investigating the insurrection case sought the maximum sentence allowed by law, the death penalty, for former President Yoon Suk-yeol, who was indicted as the ringleader of an insurrection.
At the sentencing hearing held that day before the Seoul Central District Court Criminal Division 25 (presiding judge Jee Kui-youn), the special counsel investigating the insurrection case asked the court to hand down such a sentence.
Special Counsel Deputy Park Eok-su said at about 9:35 p.m., "The defendant shows no remorse. There are no grounds to consider in sentencing, and a heavier sentence should be imposed," adding, "Please sentence the defendant to death."
Before former President Yoon, a person indicted as the ringleader of an insurrection was former President Chun Doo-hwan. Former President Roh Tae-woo was indicted on charges of engaging in important duties related to insurrection.
Park said, "In May 1997, we punished former Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who led the May 17 military coup, with sentences including life imprisonment," and added, "The public came to realize that to prevent the tragic history from repeating, an even sterner judgment than that meted out to the Chun and Roh forces is necessary."
The following is the full text of the special counsel investigating the insurrection case's closing argument in the first trial against the former president.
Closing argument
Before the substantive argument, we express deep respect to the court for its dedicated efforts to uncover the substantive truth through lengthy proceedings and multiple court hearing dates regarding the state of emergency martial law and the insurrection in this case.
We also extend our gratitude to the people, who have watched the investigation and trial process of this case with a solemn gaze.
Article 66 of the Constitution stipulates, "The president shall have the duty to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity, continuity of the state, and the Constitution." Article 69 requires the president, upon inauguration, to take the oath, "I do solemnly swear before the people that I will faithfully carry out the duties of the president by upholding the Constitution, defending the state, working for the peaceful reunification of the homeland, and striving to promote the freedom and welfare of the people and the development of national culture."
Our Constitution imposes a grave duty on the president to safeguard the Constitution and requires an oath before the people, solemnly pledging "to uphold the Constitution" and "to promote the freedom and welfare of the people."
Article 1 of the National Security Act states, "The purpose of this Act is to secure national security and the survival and freedom of the people by regulating anti-state activities that endanger the safety of the state."
This case concerns how, on Dec. 3, 2024, the sitting president, defendant Yoon Suk-yeol, and Kim Yong-hyun, ignoring the suffering the people would endure, sought to monopolize power and remain in office for an extended period by using emergency martial law as a means to usurp the legislative and judicial branches for their own lust for power. They tried to induce a military provocation from North Korea to create the conditions for declaring emergency martial law and, when that failed, declared emergency martial law by branding political activity taking place normally within the constitutional order at the National Assembly as anti-state acts plotting insurrection, despite failing to meet the substantive and procedural requirements set forth by the Constitution and the law. They mobilized the military and police to suspend by force the exercise and functions of the National Assembly, attempted to arrest political opponents and shut down media outlets, and, to manufacture a pretext to neutralize the National Assembly and to seize control of election administration, mobilized the military and police to forcibly infringe on the functions of the constitutional body, the National Election Commission, by attempting election rigging and taking over election management.
This series of acts betrayed the duty to safeguard the Constitution and promote the freedom of the people, and directly and fundamentally infringed on national security and the survival and freedom of the people. In light of their aims, means, and manner of execution, it is reasonable to assess them as bearing the character of anti-state activities governed by the National Security Act.
Furthermore, this case clearly reveals who the so-called "anti-state forces," which the defendants cited as their pretext, actually were. It is a grave case of destruction of the constitutional order by "anti-state forces," involving unprecedented acts in our constitutional history, such as armed soldiers storming the National Assembly and the National Election Commission and attempts to cut power and water to media outlets.
In particular, this case goes beyond mere abuse of authority or unlawful state management by the president and others. It is an insurrection that aimed to neutralize the state's operational structure designed by the Constitution and to reorganize state power and the governance structure through military and police force to extend rule, and thus the shock and anxiety inflicted on the people and the state were beyond measure.
From immediately after the declaration of emergency martial law, the people recalled the 1980 emergency martial law and power seizure by the Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo forces, expressing extreme anxiety and anger. The series of events—including the blockade of the National Assembly and the National Election Commission, the attempted arrests of politicians and shutdowns of media outlets, and the large-scale mobilization of armed military and police—spread a sense of crisis across society that the achievements of democracy and the rule of law that the Republic of Korea has built could collapse in an instant.
Those in positions responsible for national security, the people's lives and freedom, and the rule of law—including Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min, National Intelligence Service Director Cho Tae-yong, Justice Minister Park Sung-jae, Presidential Chief of Staff Chung Jin-suk, National Security Office Director Shin Won-sik, Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs Kim Ju-hyun, and National Security Office Deputy Director Kim Tae-hyo—were not threatened or controlled at gunpoint, were free to move and communicate, and in fact moved freely using their cellphones. Yet none of them even attempted to inform the public through the media that emergency martial law was about to be declared and that cabinet ministers were being convened for that purpose, in order to stop it.
Had even one of them communicated by text message or other means to the outside that an emergency martial law declaration was planned, the execution of emergency martial law on Dec. 3, 2024 would have been practically impossible.
Those who held public office in the government and the presidential office abandoned their duty as servants of the people and the state in a situation where national security and the people's lives and freedom were gravely threatened. They chose loyalty to defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and greed for sharing power that would follow. Fully aware that the purpose of a praetorian coup is invariably dictatorship and the extension of rule, those who joined or condoned it are precisely the ones who endangered national security and the people's lives and freedom by abetting defendant Yoon Suk-yeol's acts of destroying the constitutional order, the so-called "anti-state activities," and they deserve to be regarded as "anti-state forces."
The commissioner general of the National Police Agency and the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency commissioner, responsible for policing and responding to crime, received orders to blockade the National Assembly, the opposition party headquarters, and media outlets and carried them out without hesitation, as did the police commanders who received the orders. With a very few exceptions, the same was true of the military officers who received orders from their commanders.
Although this insurrection was overcome through the people's resistance and the National Assembly's swift measures, the conduct of these public office elites shows that, despite the punishment of the Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo forces, there remains a significant risk that attempts to destroy the constitutional order through a "praetorian coup" using emergency martial law may be repeated.
Therefore, through this trial, by punishing even more sternly than the judgment against the Chun and Roh forces the acts of destroying the constitutional order perpetrated by public office elites, we must show that the Republic of Korea can defend the constitutional order on its own through the criminal justice system.
Below, we will specifically explain how this insurrection, carried out using emergency martial law and forming the grounds for our sentencing recommendation, caused grave infringements on the constitutional order, popular sovereignty, and the foundations of democracy, and the roles and responsibilities each defendant had in that process.
[Evidence regarding the main charges]
Insurrection is a collective crime in which multiple persons jointly infringe on the existence of the state and the constitutional order through a riot, and the principle of total responsibility applies even to partial participants.
Therefore, even if the defendants did not personally participate in every riotous act that occurred in this case, once it is recognized that they participated in some of the riotous acts, they must be held criminally liable for the entire riot.
First, the motive for the crime and prior conspiracy.
Defendant Yoon Suk-yeol, defendant Kim Yong-hyun, and defendant Noh Sang-won, together with Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyeong and others, prepared an insurrection using emergency martial law prior to October 2023. By mobilizing the military and police and issuing proclamations from the martial law commander, they planned to blockade the National Assembly and the opposition party headquarters, arrest and detain key politicians to neutralize the functions of the National Assembly, seize the legislative and judicial branches through an emergency national legislative body, and eliminate political opponents in one sweep to monopolize power and remain in office long term through constitutional revision, sharing this purpose.
They sought to create the conditions for declaring emergency martial law by inducing a military provocation from North Korea through preemptive military measures. When such conditions did not materialize, they planned and conspired to declare emergency martial law under the pretext of "eradicating anti-state forces," by branding the opposition party's legislative activities, impeachments of public officials, and budget cuts as anti-state acts plotting insurrection.
Such prior conspiracy, and the objective of monopolizing power and remaining in office long term through emergency martial law, are sufficiently proven by objective materials such as Noh Sang-won's notebook, notes on Yeo In-hyeong's cellphone, instruction documents to Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok and Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min, and by statements from participants in the conspiracy, including defendants Kim Yong-hyun, Kwak Jong-geun, and Lee Jin-woo, and Yeo In-hyeong.
Second, the unconstitutionality and illegality of the emergency martial law and awareness thereof.
The emergency martial law in this case is a patently unconstitutional and unlawful measure that lacks all substantive and procedural requirements set forth by the Constitution and the Martial Law Act.
To prevent abuse of the president's national emergency powers, the Constitution and the Martial Law Act strictly limit the substantive requirements for emergency martial law. However, at the time it was declared, there were no objective circumstances that could justify it.
These circumstances were recognizable to anyone of average common sense, and the defendants fully recognized its unconstitutionality and illegality.
There was no substantive deliberation by the Cabinet, no prior countersignatures by cabinet members, and no prompt notification to the National Assembly.
These procedural defects are sufficiently proven by the statements of Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, and others.
Third, the promulgation of unconstitutional and unlawful proclamations.
During the execution of the riot in this case, proclamations contrary to the Constitution and the law were issued. Based on these, there were attempts to arrest lawmakers seeking to enter the National Assembly to vote on a motion demanding the lifting of martial law, and the people were coerced by restricting political expressions opposing martial law.
The unconstitutionality and illegality of such proclamations are clearly confirmed by numerous precedents finding similar proclamation clauses unconstitutional and unlawful in the past and by the Constitutional Court's impeachment decisions against defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and defendant Cho Ji-ho.
Therefore, it is sufficiently proven that issuing and enforcing the proclamations constituted riotous acts.
Fourth, blockading the National Assembly and controlling access by mobilizing the military and police.
During the execution of the insurrection in this case, the military and police were mobilized to blockade the National Assembly and block lawmakers from entering the main chamber, thereby obstructing the National Assembly's vote on the motion to demand the lifting of martial law.
These facts are clearly revealed by objective materials such as National Assembly CCTV footage; various call recordings including those between defendant Kim Bong-sik and Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency security chief Joo Jin-woo, and between defendant Mok Hyun-tae and National Assembly Secretary General Kim Min-ki; records of ordinary and secure phone calls; recordings from the Seoul police command net and the Yeongdeungpo Police Station event net; key directives on the police command radio net, deployment statuses, operation logs and progress reports; Telegram group chat logs of the 707th Special Mission Group of the Special Warfare Command; forensic data from the cellphone of Capital Defense Command commander Lee Jin-woo; damage materials related to emergency martial law provided by the National Assembly Secretariat; and the Constitutional Court's impeachment decision against defendant Yoon Suk-yeol, as well as statements from Special Warfare Command commander Kwak Jong-geun, Capital Defense Command commander Lee Jin-woo, martial law commander Park An-su, National Police Agency security bureau chief Lim Jeong-ju, Seoul police public safety deputy director Oh Bu-myeong, 1st Airborne Brigade commander of the Special Warfare Command Lee Sang-hyun, 707th Special Mission Group commander Kim Hyun-tae, Capital Defense Command 1st Guards Regiment commander Cho Seong-hyeon, and Capital Defense Command military police commander Kim Chang-hak.
Fifth, blockading the National Election Commission and controlling access by mobilizing the military and police.
During the execution of the insurrection in this case, the Gwacheon building of the National Election Commission was occupied and the server room was shut down, while the 2nd Investigation Unit was used to attempt arrests of key commission staff, paralyzing the commission's functions.
This is sufficiently proven by objective materials such as CCTV footage from the Lotteria Ansan Sangnok-su branch and the commission, dashcam footage from defendant Noh Sang-won's vehicle, the list of investigators from the Defense Ministry's Defense Intelligence Command and the Defense Ministry's general orders based on it, a draft Defense Ministry personnel order, ordinary and secure phone call records, and deployment statuses of each unit, as well as statements from Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyeong, Defense Intelligence Command chief Moon Sang-ho, Defense Ministry officials, and commission staff.
In addition, police and Special Warfare Command troops carried out perimeter security, occupation, and access controls on the commission's exterior and key facilities. This is confirmed by objective materials such as commission CCTV footage, 112 radio records, operation logs and progress reports, and by statements from the relevant commanders.
Sixth, operation of arrest teams targeting key politicians and others.
During the execution of the insurrection in this case, joint arrest teams were organized and operated to secure the custody of lawmakers and key politicians labeled as so-called "anti-state forces."
These facts are sufficiently proven by objective materials such as the cellphone notes of Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyeong and defendant Noh Sang-won's notebook containing plans for the joint arrest teams against anti-state forces; call recordings among National Office of Investigation and police commanders and Defense Counterintelligence Command and Defense Ministry Defense Intelligence Command officials; call records among key figures including defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and National Intelligence Service First Deputy Director Hong Jang-won, and defendant Cho Ji-ho and Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyeong; KakaoTalk group chat logs; handwritten notes by First Deputy Director Hong Jang-won; call and text message records among working-level officials; standby personnel statuses and unit logs; and the Constitutional Court's impeachment decision against defendant Yoon Suk-yeol, as well as statements from Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyeong, Defense Ministry Defense Intelligence Command chief Park Heon-su, National Intelligence Service First Deputy Director Hong Jang-won, Defense Counterintelligence Command investigation unit chief Kim Dae-woo, and Defense Counterintelligence Command investigation coordination chief Gu Min-hoe.
Seventh, cutting power and water to major media and blockading the Democratic Party headquarters.
To eliminate political opponents, Special Warfare Command troops, including the 1st Airborne Brigade, were deployed to blockade the Democratic Party headquarters and forcibly drag out everyone inside. By shutting down power and water to media outlets, they sought to block the spread of public opinion against emergency martial law.
These facts are sufficiently proven by objective materials such as Special Warfare Command operation logs and call recordings between 1st Airborne Brigade commander Lee Sang-hyun and unit members, as well as statements from Special Warfare Command commander Kwak Jong-geun, 1st Airborne Brigade chief of staff Kim Byung-joon, and 3rd Battalion commander Jang Hee-jae, and by statements from Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min and National Fire Agency officials who received Lee's orders.
[Sentencing considerations for the defendants]
Article 51 of the Criminal Act, "Conditions of sentencing," provides that in determining a sentence, the court shall consider: 1. the offender's age, character, intelligence, and environment; 2. the relationship with the victim; 3. the motive, means, and consequences of the crime; and 4. circumstances after the crime.
After explaining the gravity of this insurrection, we will present our sentencing recommendation for the defendants by examining the sentencing conditions that apply individually to them.
□ Gravity of the insurrection
1. Gravity of the insurrection threatening the community's existence
Insurrection is a crime that, through riot, unlawfully destroys the basic institutions of the state organization, endangering the democratic basic order designed by the Constitution and the existence of the state. In its nature and gravity, it is a grave crime incomparable with any other.
Past cases show that, by its nature, insurrection inevitably involves the use of military force or equivalent force, does not end with a particular faction's seizure of power or a change of administration, and, in the process of seizing and maintaining power, results in the destruction of the foundations of the national community and indiscriminate infringements on the lives, bodies, property, and freedom of the majority of the people.
Therefore, across time and place, societies have responded to crimes that fundamentally harm the existence and safety of the community with the harshest punishments.
Our Criminal Act likewise prescribes for insurrection that the ringleader shall be punished by death, life imprisonment, or life confinement, and that participation in conspiracy and the like shall be punished by death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or confinement for not less than five years.
Korea, considering the gravity and danger of insurrection, enacted the Special Act on the Statute of Limitations, etc., for Crimes of Destroying the Constitutional Order, thereby excluding the application of statutes of limitations to crimes such as insurrection and treason.
Therefore, the stern pursuit of legal responsibility for the insurrection in this case, which threatened the very existence of the Republic of Korea, is the minimum measure necessary to safeguard the constitutional order, maintain trust in the criminal justice process, and realize justice.
2. Reenactment of constitutional destruction since 1980
The emergency martial law declared by defendant Yoon Suk-yeol on Dec. 3, 2024 was the first in 44 years since the nationwide expansion of the May 17 emergency martial law carried out by the Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo forces to seize power on May 17, 1980, and its significance and shock in our constitutional history are immense.
The nationwide expansion of the May 17 emergency martial law led to the bloody suppression of the Gwangju democratization movement and indelibly imprinted on our society the horrors that can result when the highest state power steps outside the bounds of the Constitution and wields state force to commit brutal violence.
This historical experience led to a national consensus that "power seizures and constitutional destruction using emergency martial law must never be repeated." Through the June 1987 pro-democracy movement, constitutional amendments introduced direct presidential elections, expanded the powers of the National Assembly, and established the Constitutional Court, laying the groundwork for a liberal democratic constitutional order.
As a result, the Republic of Korea built a system in which state power, including the president, is institutionally checked and controlled within the bounds of the Constitution, and has been evaluated as a stable democracy by its people and the international community.
However, with this declaration of emergency martial law and the insurrection in this case, the pride of the people and the trust of the international community in the notion that "the Republic of Korea is a stable democracy," painstakingly built over time, were seriously damaged.
3. Mobilizing the military and police, who have duties of political neutrality and loyalty to the people
Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea specifies the political neutrality of the armed forces and their essential mission, and Article 20 of the regulations on the status and service of soldiers specifies the duties to protect the people's lives and bodies and the duty of loyalty to the people. The Act on the Organization and Operation of National and Local Police also declares that the essential mission of the police is to protect the freedom and rights of the people and their inviolable basic human rights and to maintain public order.
This is the institutionalization of constitutional and historical lessons, born of deep reflection on the repeated military coups and constitutional disruptions by mobilizing troops in our history, that the military and police must not be mobilized as a means to resolve domestic political conflicts or to maintain power.
Given the nature of their duties, the military and police inevitably involve and concentrate force with destructive and lethal capabilities. Accordingly, the state power that controls such force bears a strong obligation to manage and operate it lawfully and strictly in accordance with the Constitution and laws.
Nevertheless, defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and others committed an insurrection by mobilizing the military and police, thereby gravely undermining the political neutrality and essential functions of the military and police and inflicting serious damage on the morale of the many soldiers and police officers who faithfully served and on the public's trust in them.
4. Public conflict and division of national opinion
As seen during the investigation and impeachment trial process of defendant Yoon Suk-yeol after the declaration of emergency martial law, the insurrection in this case caused conflict and a division of national opinion across society at large, and this has not been short-lived but continues to this day.
Such conflict and division would not have occurred without the declaration of emergency martial law that labeled political opponents as "anti-state forces" and called for their eradication, and, even after martial law was lifted, would not have spread and persisted without the agitation by defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and others.
In particular, large-scale rallies for and against defendant Yoon Suk-yeol during his arrest and detention escalated into violence at the courthouse. As the impeachment ruling phase approached, large-scale police deployments became unavoidable, seriously undermining the stability of society and the legal order.
5. Worsening of Korea's economic situation and a drop in national credibility
Immediately after the declaration of emergency martial law, there were sharp economic shocks, including a surge in the exchange rate, a plunge in stock prices, and a contraction in consumer sentiment, which deepened overall economic instability beyond short-term market fluctuations.
As emergency martial law and the impeachment political crisis continued, the stock market recorded steep declines, evaporating enormous market capitalization and imposing a significant burden on the national economy.
Furthermore, state research institutes and the Bank of Korea officially assessed that the situation and political instability were major factors in the decline in the economic growth rate, confirming that the insurrection in this case had a substantive negative impact across the macroeconomy.
Moreover, this case dealt a severe blow to international assessments of Korea's level of democracy and national competitiveness, with key international institutions noting declines in democracy indices and national competitiveness rankings, and foreign media likewise assessing this as a significant regression of the constitutional order and democracy.
These assessments resulted in damaging, in a short period, the national trust and international standing that Korea accumulated over a long time, and the negative effects are likely to persist for a long period.
In particular, given that restoring national credibility and trust in democracy, once damaged, requires considerable time and cost, the negative impact caused by this insurrection cannot be regarded as light.
6. Need to prevent recurrence
Democracy is the best political system for realizing human dignity and freedom, but historical experience clearly shows it can be destroyed by extremist political forces.
Defendant Yoon Suk-yeol claims that emergency martial law was imposed to defend liberal democracy, but by using unconstitutional and unlawful emergency martial law to damage the functions of the National Assembly and the National Election Commission, by gravely threatening the people's political freedom, freedom of the press and publication, and the freedom of life and body, and by infringing on occupational freedom through harmful remarks targeting specific professions such as calling for the punishment of junior doctors, he destroyed the liberal democratic constitutional order.
Furthermore, this case is structural in that the preparation and execution of emergency martial law did not stem from the president's unilateral judgment alone but proceeded with the acquiescence and complicity of numerous public office elites who, despite recognizing it, sought to share power after the success of emergency martial law.
These facts show that, although the insurrection using emergency martial law could have been sufficiently deterred, it was not, and therefore there is a significant risk that similar attempts to destroy the constitutional order may recur.
Korea has a history of countless sacrifices in the struggle for democracy, including the April 19 Revolution, the May 18 Democratization Movement, and the June Democratic Uprising. In light of this, the monopolization and maintenance of power must never again come at the expense of democracy.
Therefore, stern pursuit of responsibility and punishment in this courtroom for the defendants and those who joined or abetted them is an essential measure to safeguard the constitutional order and prevent a recurrence.
7. Need for stern punishment and judgment on sentencing
In general, across time and place, societies have responded to crimes that fundamentally harm the existence and safety of the community with the most severe punishments. In determining the severity of punishment, the defendant's conduct after the crime—especially genuine remorse—has been a key factor.
This is because punishment should not be merely retributive but should serve a normative function to safeguard the basic order of the community and prevent the recurrence of similar crimes.
However, up to and including these court proceedings, defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and others have shown no sincere reflection or acknowledgment of the grave infringements their conduct caused to the constitutional order and democracy.
Instead, defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and others, driven by "the lust for power of dictatorship and prolonged rule," are distorting the facts, sophistically claiming that the unconstitutional and unlawful declaration and execution of emergency martial law were acts of governance to defend liberal democracy.
8. The people—the greatest victims in this case—calling for severe punishment
The greatest victims of this insurrection are our people, who, standing against dictatorship and authoritarianism, protected today's democracy and freedom with blood and sacrifice.
The precious constitutional values—such as democracy and the rule of law—preserved by the people's noble sacrifices, and core fundamental rights such as freedom, crumbled in an instant due to this insurrection.
The shock, fear, anxiety, wounds, and sense of loss the people suffered due to this insurrection by defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and others are indescribable, and the people's damages cannot be remedied by any effort by the defendants.
Defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and others have not been forgiven by the people, nor do they appear to have the will or attitude to seek forgiveness. The people therefore desire strong punishment and expect and trust that the court, the last bulwark of defending justice, will fulfill its role.
□ Individual sentencing grounds for the defendants
1. Yoon Suk-yeol
As president, the defendant led this crime from the conspiracy stage through execution as the ringleader of the insurrection, for which the statutory penalties are only death, life imprisonment, or life confinement. Ultimately, whether to mitigate below the statutory minimum and whether to choose death or life as the sentence must be judged by comprehensively considering the defendant's age, character, intelligence and environment, relationship with the victim, motive, means and consequences of the crime, and circumstances after the crime, as set out in Article 51 of the Criminal Act.
First, as to the defendant's age, character, intelligence, and environment, this crime was an intelligent, planned, and organized offense in which the defendant abused the status and authority of the presidency, and there are no particularly favorable circumstances for the defendant in terms of age, character, intelligence, or environment.
On the contrary, the defendant, who served as a prosecutor general and is a legal professional, is all the more blameworthy for proceeding to destroy the constitutional order despite knowing better than anyone that, as president, there is a duty to take the lead in upholding the Constitution and safeguarding the constitutional order.
Next, we address the motive for the crime.
Long before December 2024, when the political situation the defendant claims as grounds for declaring emergency martial law unfolded, the defendant had, prior to October 2023, prepared for emergency martial law with the aim of monopolizing power and remaining in office long term by seizing the judicial and legislative branches through emergency martial law.
Through historical experience, we know clearly that the justifications advanced by those in power for a praetorian coup were mere pretexts and that the essence was the monopolization and maintenance of power.
In light of the conduct actually carried out on the day of emergency martial law, the preparation process, and various documents created and distributed that day, the acts either executed under emergency martial law or that would have been executed as ordered were irreversibly destined to lead to monopolizing and maintaining power through constitutional revision.
By branding the approximately 190 opposition seats constituting the National Assembly, whose term had three years and six months remaining, as so-called anti-state forces to be eradicated to neutralize the National Assembly's functions, and to keep an emergency national legislative body in place beyond the presidential term end date of May 9, 2027, it would be predicated on maintaining emergency martial law and revising the Constitution regarding presidential election to keep the presidency.
Because constitutional amendment requires approval by at least two-thirds of all lawmakers, without suspending the National Assembly's functions and replacing it with an emergency national legislative body, the constitutional amendment intended by the emergency martial law forces is practically impossible.
Moreover, to constitute a new National Assembly before the end of the presidential term, a constitutional amendment to shorten the constitutionally guaranteed term of lawmakers would also be essential.
This series of measures is not of a nature that could be chosen simply to enjoy power for a short time, and there is no rational reason to lead or join emergency martial law merely to maintain power for the remaining approximately two years and five months.
In sum, based on objective materials such as documents related to emergency martial law and actual conduct, it is clear that defendant Yoon Suk-yeol and others, with about two years and five months left in the presidential term, planned emergency martial law with the aim of swiftly eradicating the opposition to suspend the National Assembly's functions, seizing legislative power through an emergency national legislative body, and revising the Constitution before the end of the presidential term to prolong their power.
It is evident that the emergency martial law in this case was declared after long preparation to monopolize and maintain power by eliminating political opponents—in other words, dictatorship and prolonged rule. The defendant, needing to conceal and unable to acknowledge this objective, has distorted the facts by repeatedly making false claims—such as "warning martial law"—and blaming the opposition for the motive for emergency martial law while agitating supporters.
Ultimately, like past abuses of emergency martial law aimed at seizing and maintaining power, the defendant's insurrection in this case, driven purely by lust for monopolizing and prolonging power, mobilized human and material resources such as the military and police that must be used solely for the interests of the nation and the community, making the nature of the crime extremely grave.
Next, we examine the means and methods of the crime.
Around August 2024, when he nominated defendant Kim Yong-hyun as defense minister, the defendant dismissed suspicions of martial law through the presidential office and defendant Kim Yong-hyun, saying it was "something that could not and should not happen."
Yet in the meantime, to satisfy his greed for monopolizing and maintaining power, the defendant meticulously conspired and prepared this emergency martial law over a long period.
He deceived the people.
To mobilize the military and police needed to execute emergency martial law, the defendant promoted to lieutenant general and appointed as commanders the heads of the Special Warfare Command, the Capital Defense Command, and the Defense Counterintelligence Command. He then repeatedly summoned them secretly to the presidential residence and instilled the notion that the then political situation, with the opposition holding a majority, could not be resolved without declaring emergency martial law, thereby luring them into unconstitutional emergency martial law. They ultimately became core co-conspirators in an insurrection that will be recorded in history forever and are standing trial in detention.
Although the Constitution requires Cabinet deliberation to declare emergency martial law, the defendant first attempted to declare it without such deliberation. Anticipating future procedural controversy, he selectively convened only the minimum number of cabinet members needed for a quorum and unilaterally declared emergency martial law without substantive deliberation, thereby neutralizing the Cabinet's function of checking presidential abuse of power and infringing on the constitutional right of cabinet members who were not notified to deliberate in the Cabinet.
Thereafter, as if proper Cabinet deliberation had taken place, he falsified the prime minister's and cabinet members' countersignatures after martial law was lifted.
The defendant did not stop at unconstitutionally declaring emergency martial law. After declaring it, he directly instructed National Intelligence Service Deputy Director Hong Jang-won to verify locations for the arrest of key politicians, and, to block the National Assembly's vote on the motion to demand lifting martial law, directly ordered police commissioner general defendant Cho Ji-ho to arrest lawmakers seeking to enter the National Assembly based on the proclamation banning all political activities. He also directly pressed Capital Defense Command commander Lee Jin-woo and Special Warfare Command commander Kwak Jong-geun to blockade the National Assembly and even instructed that lawmakers in the main chamber be threatened with guns and forcibly dragged out or that power be cut, ensuring those orders were relayed to military and police on the ground.
Even after the National Assembly voted on the motion to demand lifting martial law, the defendant did not promptly declare its end. He considered rejecting the National Assembly's demand or reimposing emergency martial law, and only when the military's stance became passive after the National Assembly's resolution and it appeared they would not comply did he have no choice but to announce the end of martial law. It was not a voluntary halt.
To create the conditions for declaring emergency martial law, the defendant planned and even carried out preemptive military measures to induce a North Korean military provocation. Centered on the Defense Intelligence Command, whose tasks are intelligence collection and operations, he organized a 2nd Investigation Unit to fabricate election rigging through torture, and he attempted to shut down critical media outlets by the inhumane method of cutting power and water.
The methods the defendant actually executed or planned are aggravating factors for sentencing, leaving no room for mitigation.
We next address the relationship to the victims and circumstances after the crime.
Ultimately, the victims of this insurrection are the people, who, trusting and expecting the president to do his utmost to safeguard the constitutional order and protect fundamental rights, are those whom the defendant should have protected as president.
Yet, far from sincerely reflecting on this insurrection, which caused enormous damage and harm to the nation and society after the declaration of martial law, the defendant has not once properly apologized to the people.
On the contrary, while concealing that he declared emergency martial law for dictatorship and prolonged rule, he has blamed the opposition for the cause of martial law, made implausible claims such as "warning or appeal-type martial law," incited supporters as if the emergency martial law were justified, and fueled social division and mutual animosity among the people, provoking public anger.
Ultimately, the defendant's conduct led to attempts by politicians influenced by his agitation to obstruct his arrest and to a riot at the Seoul Western District Court by some extreme supporters.
Moreover, even after being detained, the defendant has shown disregard for the criminal justice process by refusing to appear without justifiable reason or evading questioning, rather than faithfully participating in the investigation and trial. This reveals a lack of even the minimum attitude to accept responsibility for his crimes or to uncover the truth, clearly showing no sign of remorse.
In addition, during the impeachment trial and these proceedings, far from apologizing to subordinates who joined the crime on his orders and taking responsibility for their involvement, the defendant has acted irresponsibly by passing the blame—branding those who mustered the courage to testify truthfully as liars.
We turn to the possibility of recurrence.
After the nationwide expansion of the May 17 emergency martial law in 1980, democratization and the 1997 judgments punishing former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who led the May 17 military coup, with life sentences led our people to believe that a praetorian coup using emergency martial law would never happen again. At the time of this declaration of emergency martial law, many people treated the news as fake.
Yet despite the history of judgment against the Chun and Roh forces, through the conduct of the defendant and other public office elites who plotted an insurrection using emergency martial law, the people came to realize that, to prevent the tragic history from repeating, an even sterner judgment than that against the Chun and Roh forces is necessary.
Therefore, in determining the defendant's sentence, it is necessary to seriously consider the possibility of recurrence.
The statutory penalty for the crime of being a ringleader of insurrection is a maximum of death and a minimum of life confinement.
In light of the sentencing conditions described above, careful consideration is required as to whether imposing the statutory minimum of life on a defendant with no grounds for mitigation accords with the principles of sentencing.
Korea is effectively an abolitionist state regarding the death penalty, as executions are not carried out. However, the death penalty is still sought and imposed.
In Korea's criminal justice, "death penalty" does not mean executing a person but functions as the community, through the courts, expressing its will to respond to crime and sustaining trust in that response.
The defendant shows no remorse. There are no grounds for mitigation; rather, a heavier sentence should be imposed. Therefore, it is not appropriate to impose the statutory minimum. The only sentence other than the statutory minimum is the death penalty.
Accordingly, please sentence the defendant to death.