The year 2026 marks 30 years since genetically modified organisms (GMO) entered commercial cultivation worldwide. Korea does not allow the cultivation of GMO crops. However, as imported grains such as corn and soybeans are used for feed and processing, genetically modified ingredients account for a considerable portion of the supply chain. Even so, the controversy over GMOs continues to repeat. ChosunBiz examines the situation at home and abroad to look at the GMOs around us. [Editor's note]
In 2000, a "herbicide-resistant genetically modified organism (GMO) turfgrass" developed by a Jeju National University research team drew attention for being designed to survive herbicide application, reducing the number of weed-control operations and the cost of chemicals and labor. Lee Hyo-yeon, a Jeju National University professor who developed the turfgrass, said in a call with ChosunBiz, "There was an outlook that even if (the GMO turfgrass) were exported to the United States and secured just 2% of the U.S. turfgrass market, its economic value would reach 800 billion won."
But the herbicide-resistant GMO turfgrass did not reach commercialization. The research team applied for cultivation (environmental release) approval in 2007, and, following requests for supplemental data, filed additional cultivation approval applications in 2010 and 2014, but the final conclusion was "unsuitable." The time from the first application in 2007 to the final conclusion in 2023 was about 17 years.
The research team ground up the herbicide-resistant GMO turfgrass and fed it to fish for a year, confirming there were no problems. However, the Rural Development Administration cited opinions from the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, such as "the scientific data are not clear enough to acknowledge there is no risk to natural ecosystems," as grounds for deeming it unsuitable.
If the herbicide-resistant GMO turfgrass ended in an "unsuitable" conclusion after a lengthy review, some researchers gave up applying for review of GMO crops altogether. Choi Yang-do, a professor at Seoul National University's College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, developed a drought-resistant GMO rice (rice improved to reduce yield loss even in drought) in 2002 after about 10 years of research, but with domestic cultivation and commercialization paths blocked, transferred the technology to a seed corporations in India. The technology is known to have been transferred for a lump-sum fee of $750,000 (about 700 million won at the time) and a 5% running royalty.
Professor Choi said, "Drought-resistant rice was a case that showed the technological capability that 'Korea can develop a world-class agricultural product,'" but added, "I did not even apply for review because there had been no cases of cultivation approval in Korea." He also explained, "To secure varieties in response to climate change, GMO must be cultivated domestically in the long term, but even experimental cultivation for research is currently limited."
◇ "Overlapping reviews, excessive data demands, and social conflict delay approvals"
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) said in its Korea biotechnology annual report published in Dec. last year, "In Korea, there are multiple review bodies for approving the production of biotech products, and data must be submitted repeatedly, so it takes a long time," noting, "Applicants view some requirements as unrelated to the product's use or lacking scientific justification."
Risk consultation reviews conducted before utilizing or cultivating GMOs domestically are cited as a roadblock to commercialization. In the consultation review, GMOs are reported by use—food, feed, environmental release—and relevant ministries jointly examine the risks.
Kwak Sang-su, an emeritus professor of biotechnology at the University of Science and Technology (UST), said, "In a consultative structure where multiple ministries are involved in a single item, reviews are prone to drag on," adding, "Not only are the criteria for dividing roles among ministries unclear, but with rotational assignments, reviewers change and supplementary requests repeat, reducing predictability. From the applicant's perspective, it becomes a 'process with no end in sight.'"
By law, the risk consultation review period is set at within 270 days. But on the ground, there are complaints that the period runs longer. One reason is a rule that "the period for supplementing data is not counted toward the 270-day risk review period." When a request for supplementation is made, it can take months from test design to commissioning external institutions and compiling results, and cultivation and environment-related data may require appropriate seasonal conditions, further extending timelines.
The reason domestically developed GMOs cannot reach the market is not just the review structure. Social backlash and stigma have also affected commercialization decisions. A representative case is "golden rice," which the National Institute of Agricultural Sciences developed in 2008 by introducing a pepper pigment gene to boost beta-carotene, a precursor of vitamin A. The Rural Development Administration at the time touted the result, saying, "Eating just two bowls of rice can meet the daily recommended intake of vitamin A."
But as social debate grew, with the Korea Rice Producers Association calling for a halt to developing genetically modified rice, the Rural Development Administration stated it "will not consider cultivating GMO rice that lacks national consensus." The administration then disbanded the GMO Crop Project Group, the GMO research and development unit, in 2017 in response to Anti-GMO Jeonbuk Residents' Action's demand to stop the research. The USDA said, "Without strong support and advocacy from Korean farmers and consumers, commercialization is difficult."
In the end, GMOs developed domestically face a twofold threshold: uncertainty in review timelines and data requirements, and the mounting expense of social conflict at the cultivation stage.
This is fatal for domestic corporations and researchers. Emeritus Professor Kwak added, "Global seed and biotech corporations can adjust staffing and budgets to withstand long reviews, but the greater the uncertainty, the more likely domestic startups and university research teams are to postpone applying or to abandon commercialization."
◇ Will GMO regulations spread to gene-edited organisms (GEO)?
The practical barriers facing GMOs are now shifting to gene-edited organisms (GEO). GMOs generally refer to organisms engineered to have new traits by inserting foreign genes (genes from other organisms) or rearranging genes. In contrast, GEO refers to crops in which targeted genes are precisely cut to induce mutations.
Unlike GMOs, GEOs often do not retain foreign genes in the final product. For that reason, there is already discussion overseas that GMOs and GEOs should be regulated differently. The USDA has said that certain GEOs without residual foreign genes will be excluded from the scope of the LMO (living modified organism) law. Japan excluded GEOs from regulation in 2019, and high-GABA tomatoes, enhanced in "GABA" content—known as a natural calming agent—via gene editing, are now on the market.
Korea has also been discussing how to handle GEOs. A revision bill submitted to the National Assembly on Sept. 2024 distinguishes GEOs whose final products do not retain foreign genes from GMOs and moves not to apply the current LMO law-level risk assessment, but it remains pending.
Depending on the direction of the discussion, the domestic industrial ecosystem could diverge significantly. If GEOs are bound under the existing GMO framework, the long, high-cost thresholds seen with GMO turfgrass could extend to next-generation technologies. Conversely, if GEOs without residual foreign genes in the final product are categorized separately and evaluation methods and required data are rationalized, there will be opportunities for domestic technology to move into commercialization.
Jang Gu, a professor at Seoul National University's College of Veterinary Medicine, said, "GEOs should naturally be reviewed under a framework different from GMOs," adding, "In line with international trends, I hope Korea will create a new framework with reference to cases in Japan or Australia."
Professor Choi Yang-do also said, "GEOs that do not retain genes from other organisms need to be separated into a distinct category to rationalize regulation," adding, "But that alone is not enough; discussions should also proceed in parallel to create a predictable path for GMOs to move toward cultivation and commercialization in Korea."