The security core of the joint fact sheet (joint fact sheet·joint explanatory material) containing Korea-U.S. trade, commerce, and security agreements is the "approval to build Korea's nuclear-powered submarine (nuke sub)," the "expansion of authority to enrich uranium," and the "approval to reprocess spent nuclear fuel." The enrichment and reprocessing issues also lay behind the delay in producing the agreed text even two weeks after the Korea-U.S. summit. The trade portions, including a $350 billion investment package in the United States, had already been wrapped up, but the announcement was delayed while coordinating differences within the U.S. government on security matters, the presidential office said.
On the 14th in the briefing room of the presidential office in Yongsan, President Lee Jae-myung personally announced the outcome of the Korea-U.S. joint fact sheet agreement, saying, "Through this negotiation, the two countries agreed to pursue the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, a long-cherished goal of the Republic of Korea for decades and an essential strategic asset for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula," and added, "We also succeeded in securing the U.S. government's support for expanding the authority for uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing."
According to the joint fact sheet released that day by the White House and the presidential office, ▲ the United States approves Korea's construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, and ▲ within the bounds of complying with U.S. legal requirements, supports procedures that will result in Korea's uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing "for peaceful use." The plan for procuring enriched uranium, the nuke sub's fuel, will be discussed later. Although the construction site for the nuke sub was not specified, the presidential office said, "Discussions proceeded on the premise of domestic construction, and the option of building it in the United States was not mentioned."
Under the current Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, Korea may enrich uranium only below 20% with U.S. approval, and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is not allowed. This had been a fundamental block to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but it has been eased on the occasion of the summit. Regarding nuke sub construction, the government's position is ▲ the submarine hull and reactor will be built domestically, and ▲ the fuel (enriched uranium) will be brought in from the United States. Although Korea has its own enrichment technology, it intends to be supplied with U.S.-enriched uranium from an expense-efficiency standpoint.
Office of National Security Director Wi Sung-lac said, "We will build the vessel here (in Korea), and I understand we can do most of the reactor with our own technology," adding, "We think we will receive the fuel from the United States." He continued, "It is different from the Australian model. Australia lacks shipbuilding capacity, so it does not build on its own and builds in the United States and the United Kingdom," repeatedly emphasizing the differences with Australia, which builds and acquires submarines in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The large Virginia-class nuke sub currently used by the United States uses 90% highly enriched uranium as fuel. As an attack submarine that crosses oceans while being nuclear-armed, it generally does not fit Korea's shallow sea conditions or security needs, according to the presidential office. In other words, Korea would receive low-enriched uranium at the 20% to 25% level from the United States and use it in a domestically built small modular reactor (SMR).
The two countries are also reviewing a plan to conclude a separate agreement instead of revising the existing Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. Wi said, "If we refer to the AUKUS agreement between Australia and the United States, it is possible to apply an exception clause under Section 91 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act." Regardless of whether it is a revision or a new arrangement, it is quite noteworthy that Korea has secured enrichment and reprocessing authority at Japan's level. Some assess that this has laid the groundwork for securing nuclear latency at Japan's level, but the government is extremely wary of such an interpretation.
Wi said, "Neither the president nor anyone else thinks of our holding enrichment and reprocessing authority for anything other than economic and industrial purposes," adding, "We thoroughly reject linking it to nuclear latency." He continued, "The part that prolonged discussions until the very end was 'enrichment and reprocessing,'" and said, "The issue of the nuke sub construction site was raised at one point, but from beginning to end we proceeded on the premise of 'construction in Korea.' What we requested cooperation on was the part regarding nuclear fuel, and the construction site has been settled."