On the 10th, military authorities stated that the KF-16 fighter jet misfire incident that occurred on the 6th at the Seungjin Scientific Training Center in Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province, was due to the failure to perform mandatory checks by the pilot and the commanding officer of the unit. The pilot did not confirm the coordinates prior to the training, and all unit commanders failed to properly check the pilot's readiness. The Ministry of National Defense plans to launch a full-scale investigation.
The Ministry of National Defense announced that it would deploy personnel from the investigation headquarters to begin an investigation and inquiry into the fighter jet misfire incident. A Ministry of National Defense official noted, "Considering the severity of the various issues revealed in the preliminary investigation results announced by the Air Force," and added, "We will verify all areas from training preparation to post-incident stages, including the pilot's execution of duties, training control and management, and reporting systems."
The Air Force reiterated that the cause of the misfire incident, based on the investigations conducted from the day of the incident until the previous day, was the pilot's mistake in entering the coordinates. According to the investigation results, the two KF-16 pilots who dropped eight MK-82 bombs on the 6th did not correctly input the coordinates a day before the practical training. The lead pilot of aircraft No. 1 was supposed to call out the coordinates for the pilot of aircraft No. 2 to input into the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS), but mis input occurred during this process, according to the Air Force's explanation.
The coordinates were mistakenly entered as 'XX 00.XXX' instead of 'XX 05.XXX.' The coordinates manually entered by the pilot included a total of 14 items, including the flight path and target. It has not yet been confirmed whether the lead pilot made a mistake while calling out the coordinates or if the second pilot mis input them. It is reported that both pilots claimed they called out and input the coordinates correctly. It is said that only the two pilots were present during the input process. An Air Force official said, "We will have to investigate further in the future."
The coordinate input verification task was also not performed the day before the training. Typically, coordinates are printed and checked against mission plans, but at that time, the printer reportedly was not functioning properly. There also appears to have been no procedure for checking against the coordinates displayed on the computer screen. Although there were separate printouts with mission-related coordinates, the pilots did not verify them.
The target coordinates should have been confirmed in the pre-takeoff inspection phase, but this was not carried out properly. The pilot inputs flight-related data, such as coordinates, into the JMPS. Afterward, the data is stored in a device called the Data Transfer Cartridge (DTC) and mounted in the cockpit, where the relevant data is input. Both pilots stored the incorrect coordinates in the DTC, and the DTC for the second aircraft did not store the data correctly due to an error.
As a result, the pilot of the second aircraft wrote down the coordinates by hand and input them directly in the cockpit. At this point, the coordinates were found to be correctly entered. During the final verification stage, both aircraft No. 1 and No. 2 rechecked the path and target coordinates, but even then, the pilot of aircraft No. 1 did not notice the input mistake. An Air Force official stated, "They should have checked the coordinates and DTC, but they did not."
The purpose of this training was to concentrate firepower on a target by using a simultaneous attack tactic with two aircraft dropping bombs at the same time. The lead pilot felt that the flight route and terrain were different from the preliminary training after the entry point but proceeded, trusting the entered coordinates. At that time, accurate coordinates were displayed for the second aircraft. However, the pilot did not realize they had deviated from the target coordinates while maintaining the tight formation.
The pilot of aircraft No. 1 reported 'target confirmed' to the final attack controller without visually confirming the target to match the scheduled impact time and dropped the bomb. Aircraft No. 2 also dropped simultaneously according to the instructions of aircraft No. 1. This is how the correctly coordinated aircraft No. 2 ended up dropping a bomb in the wrong location. An Air Force official said, "The pilot relied on the system. They should have visually confirmed it, and that is the most regrettable point."
The Air Force also pointed out the insufficiency in command and oversight by the squadron commander (colonel) and the battalion commander (lieutenant colonel). Specifically, the Air Force stated that the unit commander failed to properly identify the issues in the combat arrangement through checks of the flight recorders, confirm the detailed flight preparation status through enemy briefing verification procedures, and conduct proper reporting and review of the mission plan for the preparatory pilots in advance.