The United States has demanded that Latin American countries raise their defense spending to 3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP). Most Latin American countries spend only 1.2%–1.3% of GDP on defense, so to meet this demand they would have to nearly triple their expenditure. The United States argued that drug cartels and organized crime cross borders and threaten security on the U.S. mainland.
On the 8th (local time), a U.S. Ministry of National Defense delegation urged participating countries at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in Cusco, Peru, to dramatically increase their defense budgets. Elbridge Colby, U.S. Vice Minister of National Defense, said, "It is important that each country invest more in its self-defense," and noted, "Some countries do not even spend 1% of GDP on defense." He went on to criticize several countries facing the threat of narcoterrorism for keeping defense expenditure under control, saying, "It defies common sense," and, "Americans are dying in large numbers because of drugs entering our country and the crimes that accompany them." The argument is that cartel crime originating in South America constitutes a direct security threat to the U.S. mainland severe enough to warrant mobilizing defense capital.
The 3.5% expenditure target set by the United States differs so much from current budgets that it would upend the existing Latin American defense structure. Latin American defense expenditure generally remains at 1.2%–1.3% of GDP. The United States considers that scale suitable only for stable countries without serious threats from gangs or drug cartels. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's 2025 released figures, the world average for defense expenditure is 2.5% of GDP. Korea spends 2.6%, and the world's largest military power, the United States, spends 3.1%. The 3.5% expenditure target presented to Latin America is higher than the global average and even higher than the United States, which is pressing others to increase defense outlays. Some Latin American countries would have to raise spending by nearly three times the current level to meet the U.S. benchmark.
The meeting drew delegations from more than 30 countries, including Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador, with an unusually high minister-level attendance rate. Among them, Peru's defense expenditure is 0.9% of GDP and Brazil's is 1.1%. Chile is at 1.58% and Bolivia at 1.37%. Mexico, the region's de facto big brother, stands at 0.7%, not even one-fifth of the U.S. target. To meet U.S. standards, Peru would need to increase its budget by about 3.9 times, Brazil by about 3.2 times and Mexico by about five times. In Latin America, the only country close to the current U.S. target is Colombia (3.2%), which has long fought rebels and cartels. The United States used the fact that only Colombia, which has waged near–civil war–level clashes, has borne defense spending slightly above the world average as justification for the criticism that "other Latin American countries are free-riding on U.S. security."
The United States has not built a collective defense system like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) on the Latin American continent. Instead, it has exercised a regional umbrella effect based on the vast security public goods it has built. Constant monitoring of drug-running vessels and rear support for aerial interdiction operations are prime examples. In his second term, President Trump is strengthening these activities with a more military and direct approach. In January, the Trump administration carried out a nighttime operation to swiftly arrest Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro, and in Mexico and Ecuador it openly proposed support for counternarcotics military operations. It also threatened to intervene directly if the Mexican government failed to produce countermeasures. When Vice Minister Colby lavishly praised the potential purchase of F-16 fighter jets by the incoming Keiko Fujimori government in Peru, which won last month's presidential election, saying it "would benefit both the United States and Peru," it was likewise interpreted as an attempt to raise defensive walls through military cooperation.
This move was assessed as the migration to Latin America of President Trump's dogged tactic of pressuring NATO allies to increase their share of defense costs. If Europe was billed for the expense of containing Russia, Latin America is being pushed to shoulder the cost of curbing cartels and controlling illegal immigration. Reuters called it "the Trump administration's new Monroe Doctrine." It went on to cite experts who analyzed it as "a multi-pronged gambit to cement leadership over regional security while blocking China's expanding influence over communications and port infrastructure."
However, it is practically impossible for Latin American governments to accept the U.S. demands. Compared to other continents such as the Middle East and Europe, Latin America faces a lower risk of external military invasion, leaving scant justification for sharply increasing defense budgets. Amid chronic fiscal woes, diverting funds from health care, welfare and education to the military also risks a major political backlash. In particular, if military forces intervene in national agendas such as cartel crackdowns, the region's chronic ailments—corruption, power struggles and human rights abuses from past military dictatorships—could flare up again.
Security chiefs attending the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas that day generally expressed resistance to the U.S. demands. According to local media in Peru, many countries, including Peru, said that rather than follow a U.S.-style security frame, they urgently need to secure their own police capacity, normalize judicial systems and make border management more efficient. Amadeo Flores Carcaño, Peru's Minister of National Defense, who is set to take office with the new government at the end of July, pointed to preparing responses to transnational crime and bracing for the El Niño weather anomaly as the region's top priorities. While he named the United States a key ally for boosting regional security effectiveness, he said, "Not everything necessarily comes down to increasing the budget." This is read as an argument that they cannot fully accept the U.S. push to force defense budget increases by wielding security public goods.