As unprecedented war clouds hang over the Middle East, the fundamental limits of the so-called CRINK block—formed by authoritarian states such as Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea—are coming to light.
Even as key partner Iran faces a life-or-death crisis at an existential crossroads, China and Russia, which had styled themselves as allies, and North Korea, which had flaunted a military honeymoon, are sticking to a stance of watching from the sidelines. They had declared an anti-U.S. alignment to build an alternative world order against U.S.-led hegemony, but in reality they appear fixated on every-country-for-itself policies that chase only their own interests.
On the 3rd (local time), the British daily the Telegraph, referring to the U.S. and Israeli invasion of Iran, said, "If the United States wins a complete victory over Iran this time, it will become harder for China and Russia to persuade potential partner countries that 'the United States is a declining power,'" adding, "If Iran drops out of the CRINK block, its influence will fall further."
CRINK is a name taken from the initials of four countries: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. It came into use at the Halifax International Security Forum in 2023 to group the four countries that share the common trait of being authoritarian with anti-U.S. and anti-Western leanings. CRINK does not share higher values or enforce mutual military intervention as a collective security system like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Diplomacy experts say it is closer to a bloc that buys and sells weapons and components according to national interests.
China and Russia had showcased anti-Western cohesion by bringing Iran into multilateral consultative bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. But in the latest U.S. and Israeli invasion of Iran, they failed to play the role of a shield protecting an ally's security. CRINK was powerless in the face of the overwhelming military might displayed by the United States.
Experts assessed that the Middle East scenario the Chinese leadership fears most is not the collapse of the current Iran regime, which leans pro-China, in and of itself. What matters most to China is maintaining a stable transaction environment rather than the Iran regime's fate. China regards as the biggest time bomb threatening its own security a situation in which, due to escalating armed conflict, Iran's state functions are completely paralyzed and the entire Middle East plunges into extreme anarchy. If Iran's control evaporates and numerous armed groups proliferate, constantly threatening the Strait of Hormuz—the key energy supply artery—global logistics paralysis and a surge in natural gas prices would be inevitable. For China, which has poured massive capital into the region and pushed ahead with Belt and Road projects, this could very likely bring the disastrous outcome of being unable to recoup investments and large-scale infrastructure projects.
China's unique diplomacy, rooted in thorough cost-benefit calculations, is also a decisive factor blocking military intervention. Rashly jumping into a U.S.- and Israel-led Middle East conflict to fight a proxy war would bring overwhelmingly more costs than benefits. Excessive military intervention or direct security support would trigger U.S.-led secondary sanctions targeting Chinese corporations, increasing the risk of completely isolating China's economy from global transaction networks.
In addition, the Chinese military can closely observe, in the vast testing ground of the Middle East, the latest U.S. weapons systems and operational tactics as they are used in real combat. The more the United States pours enormous military resources and advanced weapons inventories into striking Iran and managing Middle East conflicts, the more its capacity to project forces to the Asia-Pacific region structurally diminishes. From China's perspective, it is dispersing U.S. power and obtaining valuable military intelligence without shedding blood.
Russia is already bogged down in the vast quagmire of Ukraine, expending massive military funds and manpower. It lacks the conventional military capability to project force to the Middle East to rescue Iran or to open a second front against the United States. Russia also maintains close economic and geopolitical cooperation not only with Iran but with key Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates via the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+). Taking sides against pro-U.S. Arab states to protect the Iran regime would directly violate the role of mediator and strategy of expanding influence in the Middle East that Russian President Vladimir Putin has pursued.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a U.S. think tank, said, "Russia also maintains close ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, so it faces limits in fully supporting Iran," adding, "These relationships are merely a partnership of convenience that Western involvement could easily break."
Within CRINK, the situation for North Korea, which has the longest history of clandestine arms trafficking with Iran, is even more hopeless. North Korea and Iran had previously shared ballistic missile technology covertly and responded together to the U.S. security threat. But North Korea is now suffering from chronic economic hardship and problems of internal regime cohesion. With its own house on fire, it is in no state to provide any substantive support to Iran. North Korea's defense industry capacity is currently focused entirely on exporting artillery shells and short-range missiles to Russia for the Ukraine front in return for cash, food, and advanced military technology.
A bigger problem than the lack of capacity for substantive support is the intense psychological fear felt by the North Korean leadership. The current North Korean regime may take as a chilling warning the scene of Iran's supreme leader being eliminated in an instant by precise strikes from the United States and Israel.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on the essence of North Korea–Iran relations, said, "Beyond a shared anti-U.S. stance, the two countries have almost nothing strategic to exchange, making theirs the weakest link," adding, "Both suffer from severe funding shortages and economic weakness, making substantive mutual support in a crisis impossible."