About a year has passed since President Donald Trump reentered the White House. Launched on Jan. 20, 2025, the second Trump administration has completely upended the existing flow of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. ChosunBiz has sequentially carried an in-depth analysis of the future envisioned by Trump's second term, from the U.S.-China trade war that erupted as the administration began to on-the-ground U.S. economic policy and interviews with experts in the United States and China. [Editor's note]
One year after President Trump returned to the White House. The world is again adapting to the "age of tariff." The United States has used tariff to press for a manufacturing revival and supply chain reorganization, while China has pushed back by emphasizing that it is the world's largest production base and an irreplaceable market.
In the thick of U.S.-China competition, we posed the same questions to experts representing both countries. Their answers differed, but a common conclusion was clear. Both agreed that tariff has become a tool that shakes supply chains, investment, and security, beyond a mere trade instrument.
- Between the United States and China, which side do you think gained more in the negotiations?
Wang Yiwei
"The world is the biggest beneficiary. This is not simply a China-U.S. tariff war. It is a struggle over the order of international trade and economic and commercial relations, and a matter of safeguarding the multilateral trading system centered on the WTO and the principles of free trade. China did not fight the United States solely for its own interests. China is the only country in the world with a complete industrial chain and is independent and autonomous. It does not rely on U.S. operating systems or search engines. The world has seen China's resolve, and the United States has come to recognize the limits of its own power. From this perspective, one can say China gained."
Hufbauer
"From an economic standpoint, it is hard to identify a clear winner. Tariff is a means to pressure the other side, but it also sends expense back into the home economy. Some manufacturing institutional sector may see short-term protection, but consumer prices rise and corporations' expense increases at the same time. In research I participated in, we emphasized that while tariff can add some manufacturing jobs, the expense paid to sustain each job is very high. Politically it may look like an achievement, but in terms of overall economic efficiency, tallying the gains and losses is difficult and complex."
- What do you see as obstacles that could block implementation of the agreement?
Wang Yiwei
"There are obstacles in the process of implementing the agreement. In effect, this agreement postpones problems rather than pressuring China with tariff as in Trump's first term. The approach of dealing with China through tariff will no longer work. This year China's trade surplus topped $1 trillion, a historic level. The likelihood of replacing the U.S. market has actually grown. The United States also cannot engage in full decoupling with China."
Hufbauer
"The biggest stumbling block in implementing the deal is uncertainty. It's whether policy will be predictable going forward. If the perception remains that tariff can rise again at any time, corporations hesitate to make long-term investments. Manufacturing investments are made on a multi-year horizon, and when policy direction changes frequently, corporations inevitably postpone decisions. Because the manufacturing areas to which the Trump administration pays particular attention are not businesses that can recoup funds in the short term, it is rational to wait and see if policy is inconsistent. In fact, many corporations shifted to a wait-and-see mode during the tariff phase."
- How long do you think the conflict over regulations on semiconductors, AI, and software will last?
Wang Yiwei
"Whether high-end semiconductors or software, the United States faces a dilemma. If it does not regulate, China will overtake the United States faster in artificial intelligence; if it does regulate, China will develop on its own, posing an even bigger challenge. Because China is the world's largest application market, U.S. high-end semiconductors still have no choice but to be sold to China. Otherwise, how would technology iterate and innovate? The same goes for the TikTok algorithm issue. Problems that seem like fundamental contradictions can ultimately reach compromises."
Hufbauer
"Technology regulation is a far more direct tool than tariff. Tariff raises prices, but export controls block volumes outright. However, this approach has the long-term effect of stimulating the development of substitute technologies. Rather than complete blockage, narrowly defining and managing areas directly tied to security is a way to reduce expense."
- What will be the biggest variable in U.S.-China relations in 2026?
Wang Yiwei
"In theory, the biggest risk lies with some of the United States' allies. For example, Japan or Taiwan may try to draw in China-U.S. relations because they do not trust the United States. Overall, neither side wants to expend its energy. Of course, vested interests within the United States can cause problems, but I think it will be hard to change the larger direction of China-U.S. relations. Ultimately, the leadership of President Trump and President Xi Jinping matters."
Hufbauer
"Economically, it could be the point when the lagged effects of tariff appear in earnest. Tariff shows up as accumulated expense over time rather than an immediate shock. On top of that, there could be added U.S. legal and institutional debates over tariff authority. The durability of policy could be put to the test."
- Do you think pressure through tariff no longer works on China?
Wang Yiwei
"Yes. China's structure does not rely solely on the U.S. market. It is a country with a complete industrial chain and has already secured alternative markets and routes. The method of pressuring China with tariff is losing effectiveness."
Hufbauer
"Tariff is not a weapon that targets only the other country. Higher import prices immediately return as expense for domestic consumers and corporations. The longer tariff persists, the more that burden spreads across the economy."
- What conditions do you think are needed for China-Japan relations to ease?
Wang Yiwei
"It will not be easy for China-Japan relations to ease. Japan is accelerating rightward trends and is trying to break free from the constraints of Article 9 of the constitution. This will inevitably cause tension in China-U.S. and China-Japan relations. Such friction will persist for quite a long time."
Hufbauer
"The way the United States manages alliances also matters. The more the United States links security and trade, the more its allies will make complex calculations centered on their own interests."
- What role do you think the United States will take between China and Japan?
Wang Yiwei
"For the United States to maintain balance between China and Japan is not a true balance in practice. In the past, the U.S.-Japan alliance restrained Japan, but now it is letting Japan loose while trying not to break the larger China-U.S. strategic framework. The key factor that forces adjustments in positions in this process is the economy."
Hufbauer
"In this situation, the strategies chosen by allies are not blanket side-taking but sector-by-sector responses. The combination of security with the United States and economic diversification is on the rise."
- How do you view the U.S. role in China-Taiwan relations?
Wang Yiwei
"The United States is still trying to maintain the 'status quo.' Large-scale arms sales are driven by the military-industrial complex, and they do not fundamentally change the balance of power across the strait. In the end, they only embolden the 'Taiwan independence' camp."
Hufbauer
"From an economic perspective, such tensions increase supply chain and market uncertainty. The longer political and security conflicts persist, the more conservatively corporations calculate expense."