Wang Huiyao, chair of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), said this in a recent written interview with ChosunBiz on the outlook for China-Japan relations. Wang said this is because "the Sanae Takaichi government shows no sign of adjusting its hard line on the Taiwan issue, historical issues, and security agenda, and China is responding firmly to this and not accepting the logic of 'provoking on one hand while cooperating on the other.'"
Wang said China's ban on exports to Japan of dual-use items is "defensive and lawful," adding, "If, amid rising geopolitical tensions, the 'most extreme' scenario occurs in which Japan becomes deeply involved in Taiwan-related military actions or fully cooperates with U.S. and Western technology controls on China, China would not rule out taking broader countermeasures in accordance with the law."
Wang cited the fields of economy and trade, finance, science and technology, people-to-people exchanges, and diplomacy, saying, "Future sanctions against Japan appear likely to include tighter export controls on certain strategic materials, the suspension of science and technology cooperation projects, tougher investment screening in key industries, restrictions on people-to-people exchanges in sensitive fields, and, if necessary, adjustments in the level of diplomatic exchanges, though they will not be limited to these." After Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks about intervening in the event of a Taiwan contingency, China's advisories against travel to Japan for its citizens, the suspension of Japanese film screenings, the resumption of the seafood import ban, and the ban on exports of dual-use items were only the beginning, and broader sanctions could follow.
Wang is regarded as a leading outward-facing conduit representing the Chinese government's position. He founded CCG, a major private Chinese think tank, in 2008, and served as a policy adviser to the China State Council from 2015 to 2022. Wang has authored or edited more than 100 books on U.S.-China relations. We asked Wang about prospects for China-Japan tensions and U.S.-China tensions in 2026. Below is a Q&A with Wang.
―Is there a possibility that China will begin all-around export controls on Japan beyond the military field?
"What I want to stress is that even in an extreme scenario, China will not adopt indiscriminate sanctions or a comprehensive supply cutoff. All countermeasures will strictly follow laws and regulations such as China's export control law and anti-foreign sanctions law, focus on the risks of end-use for military purposes, and be implemented in a way that minimizes shocks to civilian supply chains and the daily lives of ordinary people."
―What do you see as the main purpose of China's export controls on dual-use items to Japan?
"The core purpose of this measure is not trade restrictions targeting a specific country, but safeguarding national security. China has consistently adhered to export control principles under the United Nations (UN) system and manages dual-use items based on end use and end users.
At a time when some countries continue to restrict exports to China in advanced technology fields and are even pushing for supply chain "de-Chinaization," China's latest move can be seen as a precise response within a legal framework. China is not restricting rare earth exports as a whole, but is tightening lawful reviews on high value-added intermediate goods that could be diverted for military purposes. This is in line with international practice.
Ultimately, this response by China is a means, not an end. The goal is to use manageable pressure to guide Japan back onto a path of dialogue and cooperation and to jointly safeguard regional peace and the stability of global supply chains."
―U.S.-China relations were once highly tense in 2025 but reached a dramatic agreement at the Busan summit. What did the United States and China respectively gain and lose?
"China was able to stem the expansion of de-Chinaization in the technology sector, buy time to develop key industries such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), and new energy, and reaffirm its advantages in key supply chains such as rare earths and critical minerals. The United States temporarily suspended some tariffs and export controls, easing domestic inflationary pressure and corporate anxiety and creating a relatively stable external environment ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.
The leaders' summit last year was an emergency brake applied just before bilateral relations were pushed to the brink. The talks did not end with unilateral pressure by either side, established a new communication mechanism, and provided an opportunity to view bilateral relations in terms of "crisis management" rather than "inertial confrontation." As a result, the two countries protected their shared interests through the summit."
―What are the main obstacles to implementing the U.S.-China summit agreement? In the first Trump term, implementation was insufficient and trust issues emerged.
"Yes. For now, the biggest obstacle is the 'trust deficit' between the two countries. This is not a short-term emotional issue but a structural difficulty accumulated through years of strategic competition, policy reversals, and misjudgments. The Busan summit agreement is broadly characterized by 'tactical implementation and strategic wait-and-see.' If this year's first-half leaders' visits and working-level contacts lead to visible, verifiable, substantive results, a degree of trust will begin to build."
―What will be the key agendas, risks, and opportunities in U.S.-China relations in 2026?
"Key agendas include AI governance and military issues, the Taiwan issue, the restructuring of global supply chains, and climate cooperation. Major risks include policy swings toward China due to the U.S. midterm elections, the instrumentalization of the Taiwan issue, and technology controls on China. As the U.S. midterm elections approach in the second half, if a Trump administration does not deliberately highlight a hard line on China, relations could pass relatively stably, but if not, they could deteriorate rapidly. Potential opportunities include reciprocal leaders' visits and multilateral meetings such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the G20, the demand for cooperation to respond to crises in Global South countries, and voices from industry in both countries against decoupling.
Overall, 2026 will be a year of managing competition and exploring cooperation. If both sides avoid clashes and confrontation and build trust in concrete areas such as economic and trade cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, and fentanyl management, the bilateral relationship could enter a "new normal" in which competition and cooperation coexist."
―The United States recently approved a large arms sale to Taiwan, drawing China's backlash. What role do you expect the United States to play on the Taiwan issue going forward?
"In cross-strait relations, the United States will continue to simultaneously ▲ encourage independence through force ▲ use Taiwan to check China ▲ and create the risk of cross-strait conflict. The United States' recent approval of a large arms sale to Taiwan is not a policy wobble but a strategic choice that instrumentalizes Taiwan, encircles China through U.S.-Japan coordination, tests China's red lines, and reflects domestic political interests. China hopes the United States will return to the original intent of "one China," halt all forms of official exchanges and arms sales with Taiwan, and become a "promoter of peace." It should not become an "instigator of conflict.""