Wang Huiyao, chair of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), said this in a recent written interview with ChosunBiz about the outlook for China-Japan relations. Wang said this was "because the Sanae Takaichi government has shown no sign of adjusting its hard-line stance on the Taiwan issue, historical issues, and security agendas, and China is responding firmly, refusing to accept the logic of 'provoking on the one hand and cooperating on the other.'"
Wang said China's ban on exports of dual-use items to Japan is "defensive and lawful," and added, "If, amid escalating geopolitical tensions, the 'most extreme' scenarios occur—such as Japan becoming deeply involved in military actions related to Taiwan or fully cooperating with U.S. and Western technology controls on China—China will not rule out taking broader countermeasures in accordance with the law."
Wang specifically cited the areas of the economy and trade, finance, science and technology, people-to-people exchanges, and diplomacy, saying, "Future sanctions against Japan appear likely to include tighter export controls on certain strategic materials, suspension of science and technology cooperation projects, tougher screening of investment in key industries, restrictions on exchanges in sensitive fields, and, if necessary, adjustments to the level of diplomatic engagement, though they will not be limited to these." He said that after Takaichi's remarks about intervening in the event of a Taiwan contingency, China's advisories against its citizens traveling to Japan, the suspension of Japanese film screenings, the resumption of the ban on seafood imports, and the export ban on dual-use items were just the beginning, and broader sanctions could follow.
Wang is seen as a representative external channel speaking for the Chinese government's position. He founded CCG, a major Chinese private think tank, in 2008 and served as a policy adviser to the China State Council from 2015 to 2022. Wang has authored or edited more than 100 books on U.S.-China relations. We asked Wang about the outlook for China-Japan friction and U.S.-China tensions in 2026. The following is a Q&A with Wang.
—Is there a possibility that China will begin across-the-board export controls on Japan extending beyond the military sphere?
"What I want to emphasize is that even in extreme scenarios, China will not adopt indiscriminate sanctions or a comprehensive supply cutoff. All countermeasures will strictly follow laws and regulations such as China's Export Control Law and Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, focus on the risk of end military use, and be implemented in a way that minimizes the impact on civilian supply chains and the daily lives of ordinary people."
—What do you see as the main purpose of China's export controls on dual-use items to Japan?
"The core purpose of this move is not trade restrictions targeting a specific country, but safeguarding national security. China has consistently adhered to export control principles under the United Nations (UN) framework and manages dual-use items based on end use and end users.
In a situation where some countries continue to restrict exports to China in advanced technology fields and are even pushing for the 'de-China-fication' of supply chains, China's latest move can be seen as a calibrated response within a legal framework. China is not restricting rare earth exports as a whole; it is strengthening lawful reviews on high value-added intermediates that could be diverted for military use. This is in line with international practice.
Ultimately, China's response is a means, not an end. The aim is to guide Japan back onto a track of dialogue and cooperation through controllable pressure and to jointly safeguard regional peace and the stability of global supply chains."
—U.S.-China relations were once highly strained in 2025 but saw a dramatic agreement at the Busan summit. What did the United States and China each gain and lose?
"China was able to halt the expansion of technology decoupling, bought time for the development of key industries such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), and new energy, and reaffirmed its advantages in core supply chain areas such as rare earths and critical minerals. The United States temporarily suspended some tariff and export controls, easing domestic inflationary pressures and corporate anxiety, and created a relatively stable external environment ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.
Last year's U.S.-China summit was an emergency braking measure taken just before bilateral ties were pushed to the brink. The talks did not end with one-sided pressure, established new communication mechanisms, and provided an opportunity to view bilateral relations in terms of 'crisis management' rather than 'inertial confrontation.' As a result, the two countries protected their shared interests through the summit."
—What are the main obstacles to implementing the U.S.-China summit agreement? Earlier, during Donald Trump's first term, implementation fell short and trust became an issue.
"That's right. For now, the biggest obstacle is the 'trust deficit' between the two countries. This is not a short-term emotional issue, but a structural difficulty accumulated over years of strategic competition, policy flip-flops, and misjudgments. The Busan summit agreement is characterized overall by 'tactical implementation and strategic wait-and-see.' If this year's first-half leader visits and working-level communications lead to visible and verifiable concrete outcomes, a degree of trust will begin to build."
—What are the key agendas, risks, and opportunities for U.S.-China relations in 2026?
"Key agendas include AI governance and military issues, the Taiwan issue, restructuring of global supply chains, and climate cooperation. Major risks include policy volatility toward China due to the U.S. midterm elections, the instrumentalization of the Taiwan issue, and technology controls targeting China. As the U.S. midterms approach in the second half, if a Trump administration does not deliberately highlight a hard-line stance on China, relations could pass relatively stably; otherwise, they could deteriorate rapidly. Potential opportunities include reciprocal leader visits and multilateral meetings such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the G20, the need for cooperation to respond to crises in Global South countries, and voices from industry in both countries against decoupling.
Overall, 2026 will be a year of competition management and exploring cooperation. If both sides avoid clashes and confrontation and build trust in concrete areas such as economic and trade cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, and fentanyl control, the relationship could enter a 'new normal' in which competition and cooperation coexist."
—The United States recently approved a large-scale arms sale to Taiwan, drawing a backlash from China. What role do you expect the United States to play on the Taiwan issue going forward?
"In cross-strait relations, the United States will continue to do three things at the same time: ▲ incite independence by force, ▲ use Taiwan to contain China, and ▲ create risks of cross-strait conflict. The recent approval of a large-scale Taiwan arms sale is not a policy wobble; it is a strategic choice that instrumentalizes Taiwan, encircles China through U.S.-Japan coordination, tests China's red lines, and reflects domestic political interests in the United States. China hopes the United States will return to the original intent of 'one China,' halt all forms of official exchanges and arms sales with Taiwan, and become a 'promoter of peace.' It should not be an 'instigator of conflict.'"