A study found that the younger generation who came of age during China's economic boom is less supportive of liberal democratic values than the older generation. It drew attention because it shows a trend different from the long-held Western political science belief that economic development ultimately leads to broader support for democracy.
On the 10th, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that a paper released in the Modern China Journal by researchers from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen campus, and the University of Strathclyde found that Chinese people born after 1990, despite showing greater economic security and post-materialist values, were less supportive than the older generation of the core principles of democracy such as free and competitive elections, protection of rights, and civic responsibility. The researchers said they set 1996 as the starting point of China's high-growth period and defined those born in 1990 as the generational cutoff, the baseline when social and political perceptions begin to form.
The analysis used responses from 3,036 Chinese citizens who participated in the 2018 World Values Survey. The researchers evaluated support for democracy using indicators such as life satisfaction, the method of selecting national leaders, and perceptions of individual rights and freedoms. They explained that while the younger generation showed a strong post-materialist tendency that values autonomy and self-expression, these values did not translate into demands for changes in the political system or support for liberal democracy.
Policymakers and academia in the West have long expected that China's economic growth and the expansion of the middle class would eventually lead to demands for political liberalization. Remarks by then-U.S. President Bill Clinton that China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) would, over time, increase pressure for reform were in line with this view. However, the study assessed that China's younger generation, even as it enjoys economic prosperity, does not necessarily aspire to Western-style democracy.
The study also pointed out that the older generation showed a more favorable attitude toward democracy. The researchers interpreted that the longer a generation experienced deprivation, the greater its gratitude for the benefits of growth and satisfaction with the system, which in turn correlated with higher interest in improving political institutions and guaranteeing rights. By contrast, the younger generation, amid an economic slowdown, job scarcity, and anxiety about the future, has seen the spread of the "sang (mourning)" culture of pessimism and resignation and the "tangping (lying flat)" ethos of getting by with minimal effort, tending to absorb dissatisfaction into personal survival strategies rather than expressing it as demands for institutional change.
The researchers noted the possibility that this generational perception gap may also be connected to ideological education that intensified after the 1989 Tiananmen incident. To prevent large-scale protests from recurring, education emphasizing the legitimacy of the system continued, and in the process, an attitude that values stability and compliance over political participation may have taken root among younger people. At the same time, some young people who internalized the national development narrative do not necessarily view Western-style multiparty systems or electoral democracy as desirable alternatives, the researchers added.
The researchers cautioned that it is not yet possible to conclude whether the younger generation's low support for democracy stems from the nature of post-materialist values, pessimism about economic prospects, or the effects of state ideological education. However, they said the findings suggest that the Western shorthand that "economic growth equals democratic expansion" may not operate in China, indicating a need to reexamine the existing framework for viewing political change in China.