As the long rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping gradually comes to an end, there are predictions of turmoil surrounding his successor. The influential U.S. foreign affairs journal Foreign Affairs analyzed in its latest issue (September/October 2025) that China has entered the most dangerous phase of 'successor succession' after the decade-long era of 'power consolidation.'
Tyler Joost, a professor at Brown University's School of International and Public Affairs, and Daniel Mattingly, a political science professor at Yale University, noted in a contribution that 'In every authoritarian regime, power succession is the biggest risk factor, and the Chinese Communist Party is no exception,' adding that 'the chaos that unfolds during the succession process could shake not only China but also the entire international situation.'
They predicted that Xi would directly intervene in the succession process to exert influence. Xi Jinping has established a strong one-man rule similar to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. There is a high possibility that the power succession will follow these precedents. The succession of power before Xi Jinping was largely tumultuous. After Mao Zedong, Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin succeeded power through political negotiations or coercion. This process involved purges and the resulting political instability. Hu Jintao was the only one to peacefully transfer power, but this process was also marred by the dramatic downfall of his rival, Bo Xilai.
The authors stated, 'Xi will also want to personally choose a figure who can carry on his political legacy,' explaining that 'the process will go beyond merely finding someone with similar political beliefs; it will be a complex process of verifying whether the chosen person can suppress all competing candidates and maintain power stably.'
Xi Jinping abolished presidential term limits with a constitutional amendment in 2018. At the 6th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2022, articles related to 'prohibition of personal worship' and 'abolition of lifetime rule,' which were noted in the Party resolution, were removed. In 2023, he broke the custom of '10-year re-election' among China's top leaders by beginning a third term. During this process, political hopefuls referenced as Xi's successors did not thrive or were purged.
Before Xi Jinping, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping replaced figures like Liu Shaoqi and Hu Yaobang, who were mentioned as likely successors. These individuals became targets for elimination due to their independent political power. The authors pointed out that the structure of Chinese politics makes it difficult for a young and capable figure to prepare for a stable succession of power in the long term. They added, 'It is nearly impossible for a successor to emerge who can learn how to operate Chinese political power without posing a threat to Xi.'
The authors predicted that Xi will lead China until at least 2032. His third term will end in 2027. If Xi succeeds in a fourth term at the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party, which will be held in 2027, the new five-year term will end in 2032.
However, there is a significant possibility of continued confusion over the succession structure even after 2032. Most of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, which corresponds to the highest leadership of the Communist Party, including Premier Li Qiang and General Secretary Cai Qi, will be in their 70s if Xi rules until 2032. Even applying the 10-year re-election standard, it will be difficult to assign a leadership role in the long term. Additionally, Ding Xuexiang, another Standing Committee member, lacks sufficient experience in local administration. Among other strong candidates, Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining lacks experience in the Standing Committee, which is considered essential for the next president. The Standing Committee is the highest power body that effectively runs China. Xi himself entered the Standing Committee five years before becoming General Secretary to prepare his successor.
If this trend continues, Xi will have to appoint either an aged transitional leader or a politically inexperienced 'dark horse' despite political backlash by the time 2032 arrives. Both options could cause significant instability in Chinese politics. It is uncertain who the military will support after Xi Jinping.
Internal unrest may not remain confined within China's borders. The authors warned that Xi may engage in a military gamble for Taiwan unification to complete his political legacy. They analyzed that he might showcase his deep military roots through war, solidifying his influence within the military and enhancing his political standing at home. The authors predicted that the more he feels 'he has little time left,' the more likely he is to take risks.
How should the international community, including the United States, respond? The authors cautioned against hasty interventions. The Chinese leadership still claims that the 1989 Tiananmen incident was a 'Western conspiracy' within the country. If the West, including the United States, intervenes in the Chinese power succession process, tensions could escalate in unexpected ways.
Instead, the United States should closely monitor this process and prepare for the possibility of a 'rapid course correction' that may arise in China after Xi Jinping. The emergence of Deng Xiaoping after Mao Zedong, who implemented a dramatic course correction known as 'reform and opening,' is a representative example. At that time, Deng Xiaoping stated, 'If we do not reform, the Party will reach a dead end,' advocating radical change. This implies that Xi's successor might reach the same conclusion.