Drones have emerged as a "game changer" on the battlefield, but Korea's defense drone competitiveness still lags behind leading countries. According to the 2024 country-by-country defense science and technology survey by the Korea Research Institute for defense Technology planning and advancement (KRIT), Korea ranked eighth in the aerial unmanned systems (drones) field. The United States is the overwhelming No. 1, followed by Israel, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia.
The United States and Israel have strengthened their competitiveness by accumulating lessons from real-world operations and repeatedly cycling operations, upgrades, and research and development. China has built an industrial ecosystem on the back of more than a 70% share of the global commercial drone market, enabling low-cost, high-efficiency mass production and aggressive technology investment. Korea, by contrast, remains stuck in a development and acquisition system centered on existing weapons systems such as aircraft and tanks, and is failing to respond to the rapidly changing drone battlefield environment.
ChosunBiz met three experts in policy, industry, and academia who play key roles in Korea's defense drone industrial ecosystem at the National Assembly on the 28th. We asked Representative Lim Jong-duk of the People Power Party, a former Army major general who sits on the National Defense Committee, Kim Ji-hong, head of the Future Convergence Technology Institute at Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), a domestic defense company, and Professor Yoon Yong-jin of mechanical engineering, who heads the KAIST defense drone specialized development institute, about the current state of Korea's defense drones and ways to strengthen competitiveness.
Experts agreed that "more important than the ranking of eighth in the drone world is that the structural gap is widening." They stressed, in particular, the need to graft a development and acquisition system suited to drone characteristics onto the current force-integration system designed around aircraft and tanks. The military currently applies a "batch verification method" that seeks to satisfy all required performance at once, which makes drone development a long process. Overseas, by contrast, they adopt "evolutionary development," allowing some shortcomings, deploying quickly, and improving during operations.
The budget and demand structure were also cited as constraints. Given the nature of the defense industry, the government is virtually the only buyer of defense drones, but the related budget is insufficient. Of this year's 19.9653 trillion won in force improvement program spending, the drone project budget is only 148.4 billion won. Experts said, "This structure limits the creation of a defense drone industrial ecosystem," and added, "For Korea to leap to a drone powerhouse, the government needs to design the market and industrial base through policy and budget." The following is a Q&A.
―Drones have recently emerged as a key capability on the battlefield.
Representative Lim Jong-duk of the People Power Party (hereafter Lim Jong-duk) "In recent wars, cases are repeating in which drones costing a few million won neutralize tanks worth tens of billions of won. The battlefield is being reorganized around manned–unmanned teaming, and how quickly and efficiently drones are operated will decide victory or defeat."
Professor Yoon Yong-jin of KAIST's mechanical engineering department (hereafter Yoon Yong-jin) "The cost structure between high-priced weapons systems and low-cost drones has been completely reversed. The key is how cheaply, in large numbers, and quickly weapons can be deployed and operated as expendable assets. In particular, drones combined with AI perform "detect–decide–strike" on a single platform and are shifting command-and-control into an automated and autonomous structure."
―What is the competitiveness level of Korea's defense drones?
Lim Jong-duk "According to the Korea Research Institute for defense Technology planning and advancement (KRIT), Korea has secured a certain level of technology in the drone field, but the gap with leading countries remains large and stagnant. The ranking is eighth, but what matters is not the ranking; it is the technology gap itself, such as the accumulation of combat-proven technologies and industrialization. The United States is the overwhelming No. 1, followed by Israel, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia.
In particular, the United States and Israel differ significantly in that they accumulate lessons through real-world operations and then repeat operations, upgrades, and research and development. China has built an industrial ecosystem on the basis of more than a 70% share of the commercial drone market, enabling low-cost, high-efficiency mass production and active technology investment."
Kim Ji-hong, head of KAI's Future Convergence Technology Institute (hereafter Kim Ji-hong) "In fact, Korea achieved relatively rapid force integration in defense drones. The Corps UAV Songgolmae, developed by KAI in the 1990s, achieved initial market entry success by being integrated into the force in 2002 and operated stably for about 25 years. However, we are now behind not only China but also latecomers such as Türkiye and Iran. We need a sober assessment and reflection on the causes of this gap. Especially in small drones, Chinese companies have achieved economies of scale based on mass production, price competitiveness, and a global export market, but Korea has not yet reached that level."
―As the commercial drone market has been reorganized around Chinese corporations, concerns are growing about supply chain dependence.
Yoon Yong-jin "One of the key tasks of KAIST's defense drone specialized development institute is drone localization. We tried to find domestic corporations capable of developing ultra-small advanced drones, but the reality is there are not many options. Core components are essentially dependent on China, which affects not only hardware but also software and data competitiveness. Our own analysis shows Korea's defense drone competitiveness is about eight years behind leading countries."
Kim Ji-hong "KAI is also developing expendable drones, but we exclude Chinese parts for major components such as engines. As a result, it is true that we face difficulties in quality and price control. Localization is necessary, but the market is small, making it hard for corporations to invest aggressively."
Lim Jong-duk "Because drones are remote unmanned systems that rely on sensors and communications, they carry structural vulnerabilities in terms of security. If core components depend on overseas sources, it can directly lead to operational control and information security issues, so localization is an imperative task even if it entails expense."
―Korea's drone industry must have strengths as well.
Yoon Yong-jin "A solid manufacturing base and IT infrastructure. In particular, communications technology, semiconductor capabilities, and the speed of development and improvement are core strengths in the drone industry. This foundation can be a significant advantage for networking and autonomy in drones. With strategic, nationwide investment and support, it is entirely possible to raise industrial competitiveness in a short time."
Kim Ji-hong "Leading corporations like KAI have the technological capability to develop high-end models on par with the U.S. Reaper. Low-cost drones are also technically feasible, but the market is not yet sufficiently formed, so business viability remains weak."
―At a time when forming a domestic drone market is important, the government is virtually the only buyer due to the nature of the defense industry. There are concerns that the related budget is insufficient.
Lim Jong-duk "For Korea to leap to a drone powerhouse, the key is for the government to design the industrial ecosystem through policy and budget. However, of the 19.9653 trillion won in 2026 force improvement spending, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration's budget for drone development and acquisition is only 148.4 billion won, a very small share. Even that is organized mainly around reconnaissance and surveillance, so investment in attack drones that match recent battlefield trends is limited. Drones are a field where technology changes quickly, but the current budget size and force-integration plans do not sufficiently reflect this. The current level is not enough to induce corporate participation and create demand."
―The current defense drone development and acquisition system is also criticized for its limits.
Lim Jong-duk "The current force-integration system is designed on the premise of a mid- to long-term acquisition structure, so it can take up to 10 years from requirements submission to research and development, testing and evaluation, and force integration. This approach suits high-cost, long-service systems like aircraft and tanks, but it has clear limits for drones, where technology changes rapidly and performance evolves over short periods."
Kim Ji-hong "We need comprehensive institutional reform from requirements to force integration. Our military currently applies a 'batch verification method' that requires meeting all performance requirements at once, whereas overseas they adopt 'evolutionary development,' allowing some deficiencies, deploying quickly, and then improving. For example, the Turkish attack UAV Bayraktar TB2, operated by the Ukrainian military, was integrated into the force after fewer than 10 flight tests over several months, whereas we have cases where projects were halted despite conducting more than 200 tests over multiple years. With this structure, it is difficult to secure competitiveness in drones."
Yoon Yong-jin "The global trend in drone development has already shifted to rapid development on a months-long timeline. The U.S. Department of the Ministry of National Defense's 'SkyFoundry' program is a representative example of this change. It aims to produce and deploy low-cost expendable drones quickly and to continuously improve performance during operations. The key is digitally connecting design, manufacturing, and deployment, and binding the military, private corporations, startups, and research institutes into a single ecosystem to realize rapid force integration."
Professor Yoon stressed the need to pay attention to the system of Firestorm Labs, a U.S. drone startup invested in by Lockheed Martin and JP Morgan. Yoon said, "Firestorm Labs has a system for mass-producing expendable mini-drones in the field through a mobile 3D-printing factory that can manufacture drones right on the battlefield," and explained, "The basic platform is standardized so it can be immediately modified for missions such as attack and reconnaissance."
―K-defense is achieving results in the global market. What about a 'package' export strategy that combines drones with existing weapons systems?
Kim Ji-hong "K-defense is competitive today because the weapons systems developed over many years have been actually operated by our military, and that accumulated experience has translated into trust in overseas markets. The drone field lacks such operational experience and systems. Strategically, rather than viewing drones as a separate, independent market, we need to approach them as a 'package' combined with existing K-defense systems. As the battlefield shifts to manned–unmanned teaming, there are still opportunities from a total-solution perspective."
―The government is reorganizing the Drone Operations Command, which exclusively handles drone and UAV operations, and is discussing a service-centric operational structure.
Lim Jong-duk "In 2023, the government created the Drone Operations Command and elevated drones from a simple surveillance and reconnaissance tool to a joint combat capability encompassing reconnaissance, strike, and electronic warfare. Although a joint public–private–military committee later recommended disbandment, the Ministry of National Defense opted for reorganization instead. The Ministry of National Defense is currently considering dispersing operational missions across the services and reorganizing the Drone Operations Command into a dedicated body responsible for concept development, rapid acquisition, and civil–military cooperation. If we shift to a service-centric structure, it will be important to grant sufficient authority so each service can expand autonomy in drone procurement, budget acquisition, and performance upgrades and operate them in line with mission characteristics."
―The government is also pursuing a plan to train '500,000 drone warriors.'
Lim Jong-duk "This year, the government aims to introduce about 11,000 units to the Army, about 80 to the Marine Corps, and about 110 for reservists, with a related budget of about 33.3 billion won. Expanding demand can help build the industrial ecosystem, but the objectives of education and training and industrial policy are mixed. A review of the project budget by the National Defense Committee's Subcommittee on Budget and Accounts found that drones using Chinese components had a unit procurement cost of about 1.7 million won, while applying domestic components raised the cost to more than 2.9 million won per unit, creating a heavy unit-price burden.
Considering damage during training, education and training should strengthen real-world proficiency with low-cost expendable drones, while industrial policy should be designed as a separate ecosystem. We also need to build a training system that can secure operational capability in a short time."
Yoon Yong-jin "Given today's high drone unit prices, if troops damage equipment during operation, it becomes a major burden on training itself. We need to build an industrial ecosystem that can lower prices. Only by basing training on low-cost expendable drones can we enable repeated practice and raise proficiency. It is also effective to fully train through simulation programs before operating real drones, which can reduce both expense and the risk of accidents."