A view of the store inside the Jamsil branch of Homeplus Co. in Songpa-gu, Seoul, on the 5th. /Courtesy of News1

This article was displayed on the ChosunBiz MoneyMove (MM) site at 6:33 a.m. on July 8, 2026.

With the abolition of Homeplus Co.'s rehabilitation plan, contingent debt such as various payment guarantees and capital support agreements that MBK Partners agreed to bear during the rehabilitation process is becoming real. Beyond investment losses from the management failure of a portfolio company, even the financial support provided directly during rehabilitation is turning into an actual repayment burden. The market estimates that, when adding the DIP financing loan, the capital support agreement, and funds directly borrowed and injected, MBK Partners' burden will reach about 400 billion won.

According to the investment banking (IB) industry on the 8th, Curious Partners declared an event of default (EOD) on July 3 for the 60 billion won DIP (Debtor-in-Possession) financing loan provided to Homeplus Co. This loan is funding that Homeplus Co. received at an annual interest rate of over 10% after it entered corporate rehabilitation proceedings in April last year. Curious is expected to soon hold talks with Chairman Kim Byung-ju of MBK Partners and Vice Chairman Kim Kwang-il for cash repayment.

MBK Partners provided multiple rounds of direct and indirect support during Homeplus Co.'s rehabilitation. Regarding Curious's DIP financing loan, Chairman Kim and Vice Chairman Kim provided joint and several guarantees and agreed not to exercise the right of indemnity against Homeplus Co. even after repayment. In March, it injected 100 billion won into Homeplus Co. through its own borrowing. In the process, Chairman Kim provided personal assets, including his residence, as collateral.

For the 150 billion won working capital loan raised at the end of 2024, MBK Partners provided a capital support agreement. The contract format is an agreement to supplement interest payments, but with no limit on term or amount, meaning that if Homeplus Co. fails to repay the debt, it is effectively structured to shoulder both principal and interest. MBK Partners has already directly paid about 23.1 billion won in interest arrears. As long as the contract remains in place through 2027, the annual interest burden is expected to be about 20 billion won, totaling more than 60 billion won.

This burden is tied to MBK Partners' failed investment in Homeplus Co. MBK Partners acquired Homeplus Co. in 2015 for about 7.2 trillion won. However, the financial burden from the leveraged buyout (LBO) and the failure to adequately respond to changes in the online retail market prolonged weak results, and ultimately the corporate rehabilitation was followed by the abolition of the rehabilitation plan.

The industry views this case as rare even in the domestic private equity fund (PEF) market. Typically, when portfolio corporations deteriorate, the general partner (GP) bears investment losses, but cases like this—directly shouldering cash-like obligations in the hundreds of billions of won through payment guarantees and capital support agreements—are said to be hard to find precedent for.

While Meritz Financial Group, the largest creditor of Homeplus Co., and the Homeplus Co. labor union said MBK Partners should be held more accountable, some in the PE industry argue that a bad precedent has been set.

An industry official said, "The 60 billion won DIP financing loan is only the beginning, and it is highly likely that rights will continue to be exercised over other contracts such as the capital support agreement," adding, "Given MBK Partners' funding structure, a significant portion of performance fees generated over the next few years is likely to be used to repay debt."

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