A temporary closure notice is posted at the Homeplus Co. Jamsil branch in Songpa-gu, Seoul. /Courtesy of News1

This article was displayed on the ChosunBiz MoneyMove (MM) site at 5:19 p.m. on Jun. 11, 2026.

Attention is focusing on why Meritz Financial Group assessed the collateral real estate of Homeplus Co. at around 1.5 trillion won. That amount is almost the same as the size of the senior principal and interest that Meritz needs to recover.

If, as Meritz judges, the collateral value is only in the mid-1 trillion won range, then even if the collateral is disposed of, most of the proceeds would go to recovering the existing principal and interest. In that case, if Meritz is to provide additional debtor-in-possession funding to Homeplus Co., the existing collateral alone would be insufficient, and separate credit enhancement such as a controlling shareholder guarantee would be needed. This supports Meritz's existing position of demanding credit enhancement from MBK Partners.

◇ If collateral is 1.5 trillion won, even principal-and-interest recovery is tight… grounds for DIP support weaken

According to the investment banking (IB) industry on the 11th, Meritz argues that the current value of Homeplus Co. store collateral real estate has been revised down to at least 1.5 trillion won. Considering that the real estate appraisal at the time Homeplus Co. borrowed 1.3 trillion won from Meritz in 2024 was in the high-4 trillion won range, it effectively cut the collateral value to about one-third in just over a year.

The price Meritz assessed this time is closer to a disposal price premised on enforcing the collateral right than to an appraisal of a store in normal operation. The underlying logic appears to be that, if a large store of a retailer under rehabilitation is sold at once, bidders are limited and the actual recovery amount can vary greatly depending on whether the use can be changed or operations can continue.

Homeplus Co., on the other hand, sees the total real estate value in the high-2 trillion won range. The price is based on the liquidation value calculated by the rehabilitation investigator earlier this year and the court's appraisal results.

What the industry is watching is the figure itself of "at least 1.5 trillion won" presented by Meritz. Previously, the total Homeplus Co. rehabilitation claims that Meritz filed with the Seoul Bankruptcy Court last year came to 1.3028 trillion won, including 1.2166 trillion won in unpaid loans and 86.1 billion won in unpaid interest. After 51.5 billion won from the sale of the Sinnae store was repaid early, the outstanding loan balance fell to the 1.1 trillion won range.

However, if default interest of up to 20% is reflected at the maximum under the contract, Meritz's principal-and-interest amount is estimated to increase to around 1.5 trillion won. An industry official said, "It is noteworthy that the Homeplus Co. collateral value claimed by Meritz aligns with the maximum contractual principal-and-interest recovery amount," adding, "This supports the logic that even if the collateral is disposed of, there is almost no room left after recovering the existing senior principal and interest."

In other words, it becomes possible to argue that even if Meritz provides additional operating funds to Homeplus Co., it would be difficult to secure recovery stability with the existing collateral alone. Conversely, if the collateral value is in the high-2 trillion won range, the recovery stability of existing claims increases and Meritz's grounds to refuse additional funding become relatively weaker.

◇ Yeoksam-dong and Gasan W Mall cases resurface… if Homeplus is liquidated, junior creditors and partners are hurt

In this context, cases of disposing of real estate project financing (PF) business sites in which Meritz participated in the past are being raised again. At distressed PF business sites, collateral is often disposed of at prices lower than normal appraisals, and final disposal prices frequently form near the amount recoverable by senior lenders. In such cases, senior lenders recover principal, while mezzanine and junior lenders or existing stakeholders bear losses.

On the day, Rep. Yoo Dong-soo of the Democratic Party of Korea, who chairs the MBK Homeplus TF, held a press conference in front of Meritz Securities in Yeouido, Seoul, and said, "Amid a slump in the real estate market, Meritz once shifted all losses from the Yeoksam-dong mixed-use development project to the parent company and junior creditors and reaped huge profits."

The "Yeoksam-dong mixed-use development" Yoo mentioned refers to the development project in 832-21 Yeoksam-dong, Seoul. In 2024, Meritz declared an EOD as a senior lender at that business site and proceeded with a public auction. At the time, the KT Estate–LaSalle Asset Management consortium won the bid at 155 billion won, about 67% of the 230.8 billion won appraisal. In the process, the 130 billion won senior amount and 7.2 billion won in bridge loan extension fees were recovered, while the mezzanine and junior lender group reportedly suffered significant losses. Meritz later also participated as the lead arranger in raising 419 billion won in PF for the new buyer.

W Mall in Gasan-dong, Guro-gu, Seoul, was a case where the disposal price was even closer to the senior recovery amount. After an EOD in 2023, a public auction was conducted, and the final sale price fell to 88 billion won. Of the existing 163 billion won loan, the senior portion was 85 billion won; Meritz, the senior lender, recovered its loan through the sale, but the mezzanine and junior lender group could hardly avoid losses.

Similarly, the logistics center development business site in Icheon, Gyeonggi, where Meritz was the No. 1 beneficiary, also began public auction in 2024 at an appraised value of 87.2 billion won and, after eight failed bids, was sold to Taemyung Industrial for 60 billion won in Feb. 2024. According to the industry, Meritz is known to have recovered in full.

These cases suggest that Meritz's PF operation style has pursued recovery stability based on senior collateral rights. When project viability deteriorates, it wraps up existing exposure through EOD and public auctions and then reconsiders whether to participate in new financing if a new buyer or funding structure is arranged.

It is difficult to conclude that this approach will be applied to Homeplus Co. Homeplus Co. is not a single development project but an operating retail company, with supplier networks, employment, and goodwill intertwined along with store real estate. Even so, some warn that if Homeplus Co. moves to liquidation or collateral enforcement, a recovery structure similar to some PF business sites could come into play.

If Meritz enforces its collateral rights, Homeplus Co.'s store real estate could be disposed of through public auctions. In that case, as a senior collateral holder, Meritz is entitled to recover its claims preferentially from the proceeds. If a new buyer acquires the asset or pursues refinancing, there is also room for Meritz to participate again as the lead arranger.

An industry official said, "If the collateral real estate is disposed of at a low price, the loss burden on junior creditors and general rehabilitation creditors could grow," adding, "In the case of Homeplus Co., suppliers, employees, and the store operations network are all intertwined, so the fallout from liquidation or rapid asset disposals could be greater than at ordinary PF business sites."

Meanwhile, MBK Partners the previous day announced plans to provide an additional guarantee for the 100 billion won DIP, but differences with Meritz remain unresolved. On the day, Meritz said it is reviewing providing the 100 billion won DIP, adding the condition that "the guarantees of MBK Partners' headquarters and controlling shareholder Chairman Kim Byung-ju must be a prerequisite."

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