This article was displayed on the ChosunBiz MoneyMove (MM) site at 4:39 p.m. on Nov. 26, 2025.
Homeplus Co., which is pushing a pre-rehabilitation merger and acquisition (M&A), closed its public tender but no bidders emerged, deepening the dilemma for Meritz Financial Group, its largest creditor. Although it holds real estate assets as collateral, it is only watching for now because if it sells them rashly, the criticism once directed at MBK Partners could turn toward Meritz Financial Group.
According to the investment banking (IB) industry on the 26th, Samil PwC, the sell-side advisor for the Homeplus Co. deal, closed the main bidding for the acquisition at 3 p.m. the same day, but no one bid. Harex InfoTech, an artificial intelligence (AI) retail company that took part in the preliminary bidding, and Snowmad, a real estate developer, did not show up for the main bidding either. The rehabilitation court said it plans to discuss how to proceed with the rehabilitation process going forward, including whether to hold a re-bid.
Industry analysts say the party most distressed as the Homeplus Co. sale drags on is not MBK Partners, the private equity fund (PEF) manager and largest shareholder, but Meritz, the creditor. MBK Partners has already given up management control by canceling Homeplus Co. common shares for no consideration. Meritz, which still has money to be repaid, has interests that vary depending on the Homeplus Co. sale price.
Meritz Financial (securities, non-life insurance, and capital) lent about 1.2166 trillion won to Homeplus Co. in May last year and secured 62 domestic big-box stores in trust as collateral. The loan carries an annual interest rate of 8% and matures in three years. The collateral appraisal value is 2.8174 trillion won, so on a simple calculation there is no problem recovering the principal. Meritz had recovered 256.1 billion won, including principal and interest, by May and still needs to collect about 1 trillion won more.
The problem is that it is close to impossible for Meritz to exercise its collateral rights. MBK Partners also tried to improve cash flow by closing additional stores but put that on hold after a public backlash. For Meritz to exercise its collateral rights, closures would be unavoidable, but the labor union and political circles are demanding a halt to closures, citing job insecurity and downturns in local commercial districts.
Internally, Meritz is most wary of a reversal in public opinion. In September, Meritz prepared an internal document related to the Homeplus Co. situation. Through a document titled "Key issues regarding MBK and Homeplus Co. rehabilitation," it criticized the actions of MBK Partners to date. Considering that the larger MBK Partners' burden-sharing becomes, the greater the chance of debt recovery, this is a natural stance.
In the end, Meritz has no choice but to look to a sale of Homeplus Co. However, if Homeplus Co. is sold for less than the 2.6691 trillion won in rehabilitation claims, Meritz, the creditor, will inevitably incur losses. The IB industry expects the Homeplus Co. M&A to be concluded only after government or political involvement, before the local elections in June next year.
An IB industry official said, "The Homeplus Co. M&A is already difficult to resolve by market logic, so under government pressure, strategic investors (SI) such as NongHyup are likely to make acquisition offers at a price below 2.7 trillion won," adding, "The lower the price, the higher the likelihood of a sale, but if Meritz refuses because it does not want to take a loss, the criticism will swing back to Meritz."